International Mega-Events and Urban Planning in the Context of Toronto

by

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A Major Paper
submitted to the Faculty of Environmental Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Environmental Studies
York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Date: July 25, 2017.
Abstract

This paper explores mega-events and their relationship to urban planning and public participation. Mega-events, often referred to as hallmark events, are short-term, high profile spectacles that have a massive popular appeal, a large mediated reach, and international significance (Hall, 1992; Roche, 2000). Mega-events include major fairs, festivals, expositions, such as the World Expo and significant sporting events like the Olympic games and the FIFA World Cup. For many cities, mega-events are an alluring urban strategy that “promises” tangible and intangible benefits for cities and nations (Burbank et al., 2001). These short-lived events can have tremendous influence over urban spaces, built environments, and city populations (Greenhalgh, 1988; Roche, 2003). Given their impacts, it should not be a surprise that these events have encountered various forms of resistance (Lenskyj, 2008; Cottrell, 2011; Gotham, 2016). A significant amount of this opposition focuses on the lack of accountability, transparency, and public engagement that is often seen in the various mega-event hosting processes (Kidd, 1992; Flyvbjerg, 2003; Hall, 2006). Those that oppose these events critique the undemocratic nature of decision-making processes used to bid for and plan hallmark events (Kidd, 1992; Gotham, 2011).

Through this essay, I will argue why participatory planning strategies must be used for the development of inclusive decision-making processes in mega-event planning within the city of Toronto. I will argue that although public engagement and a commitment to participatory planning has seemingly been devalued in the city’s history of pursuing the hosting of a hallmark event, they are essential components for the successful and equitable bidding and planning of such events. I believe participatory planning can be used for the meaningful consideration of various public interests and the creation of a “hosting concept/vision” that works towards the
advancement of varying city priorities across a wide range of local communities. When thinking of how to engage varying communities in mega-event planning processes, it is vital to consider what engagement approaches have been used in previous mega-event hosting attempts, and what future strategies are recommended for the city of Toronto.
Foreword

The following essay is a culmination to my Area of Concentration outlined in my Plan of Study (POS). The Area of Concentration for my POS was to explore what political structures and power relations influence the development of our built environments and the productions of space, and how the legitimacy of planning is established in the public sphere.

The three components of my ‘Area of Concentration’ and ‘Learning Objectives’ involved exploring and understanding conceptualizations of ‘Urban Planning’, ‘Urban Policy and Politics’, and ‘Participatory Planning’. My objectives were to gain theoretical knowledge and practical competencies over the planning practice, a solid understanding of the exercise of power within urban spaces, and good comprehension of participatory approaches within planning and the role of citizens within urban-decision making-processes. These components were investigated throughout my two-year MES academic experience within courses, workshops, and field experiences.

I finalize this Area of Concentration study through this Major Paper, which analyses conceptualizations of public involvement and power throughout international mega-events urban processes within the context of Toronto. Through this essay, I will argue why participatory planning strategies must be used for the development of inclusive decision-making processes throughout mega-event planning within the city of Toronto. Through this focus, I engage with understandings of urban planning and urban power structures and its relationship to the public sphere. This final paper takes a comprehensive look into participatory approaches within planning in Toronto, and its importance for successful and equitable results.
Acknowledgments.

I would like to extend my utmost gratitude to my MES Supervisor Dr. David Roberts. I appreciate your continued patience, guidance and inspiration throughout this project. Thank you for sharing your vast knowledge and experience with me. You have left a marvellous and memorable imprint within my academic experience.

I would also like to thank my Advisor Dr. Abidin Kusno for assisting and guiding me throughout the development of my Plan of Study and the MES program. It was a pleasure to have meet you and have you as my advisor.
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1. Introduction

Mega-events, often referred to as hallmark events, are short-term, high profile spectacles that have a massive popular appeal, a large mediated reach, and international significance (Hall, 1992; Roche, 2000). Mega-events include major fairs, festivals, expositions, such as the World Expo and significant sporting events like the Olympic games and the FIFA World Cup. For many cities, mega-events are an alluring urban strategy that “promises” tangible and intangible benefits for cities and nations (Burbank et al., 2001). These short-lived events can have tremendous influence over urban spaces, built environments, and city populations (Greenhalgh, 1988; Roche, 2003). Given their impacts, it should not be a surprise that these events have encountered various forms of resistance (Lenskyj, 2008; Cottrell, 2011; Gotham, 2016). A significant amount of this opposition focuses on the lack of accountability, transparency, and public engagement that is often seen in the various mega-event hosting processes (Kidd, 1992; Flyvbjerg, 2003; Hall, 2006). Those that oppose these events critique the undemocratic nature of decision-making processes used to bid for and plan hallmark events (Kidd, 1992; Lenskyj, 2000; Gotham, 2011).

Within the last three decades, Toronto has had an interesting history with mega-event processes. Through this essay, I will argue that participatory planning strategies must be used in the development of inclusive decision-making processes in mega-event planning within the city of Toronto. I will argue that although public engagement and a commitment to participatory planning has seemingly been devalued in the city’s pursuit of hosting a hallmark event, they are essential components for the successful and equitable bidding and planning of such events. Participatory planning can be used for the meaningful consideration of various public interests and the creation of a “hosting concept/vision” that works towards the advancement of varying
city priorities across a wide range of local communities. When thinking of how to engage varying communities in mega-event planning processes, it is vital to consider what engagement approaches have been used in previous mega-event hosting attempts, and what future strategies are recommended for the city of Toronto.

Chapter two examines the scholarly literature over mega-events, urban planning, and participation planning. Through this review, I study mega-event processes and their relationship to planning processes and the ideals of democratic public involvement. Chapter three provides a case study analysis of three mega-event planning processes in Toronto, which include the 1996 Olympic Bid, the 2008 Olympic Bid and, the 2025 World Expo pre-bid. These three cases were chosen to explore mega-event discourses and planning processes within the last three decades of the city of Toronto. I use a multiple case study approach to explore the differences and similarities between these cases and to uncover how Toronto has engaged with mega-events, what approaches were used when planning these events, and to identify forces that have driven mega-event aspirations in the city. In Chapter four I argue that public involvement and community engagement are critical for the successful planning of any mega-event process in the City. I do this by analysing Toronto’s existing planning legislation and the values that enforce the inclusion of public involvement within decision-making processes. I elaborate on why public involvement must be used for the development of “hosting visions” which are representative of existing city goals and the public interest. I then close by analysing some planning principles that can be used for successful public engagement.
1.1 Methodology

For this major project, I used a mixed set of methods to generate both quantitative and qualitative data. This research began with a literature review of scholarly articles, that explored current and historic thinking on the relationship between mega-events and urban planning. This review will uncover existing perceptions of mega-events and their influence over urban populations, politics and the productions of urban space. I continued this analysis by examining existing planning and policy documents from the City of Toronto, which revealed the general visions and ongoing discourses and perspectives of city building and planning.

Another research method I used involved the use of case studies. This method facilitates the exploration of a phenomenon within its context, and allows different data sources and lenses to uncover multiple facets of an occurrence (Bassey, 2003; Baxter & Jack, 2008). The three case studies for this research involve the 1996 Olympic Bid, the 2014 Pan-Am Games, and the 2025 Expo Bid. Using a multiple case study approach, allowed me to better understand how Toronto has engaged with mega-events and what approaches where used when planning these events. Additionally, I was able to identify forces that have driven the mega-event aspirations in the City. I focused specifically on understanding how the public was engaged throughout these political decision-making processes in each case. To obtain this information I explored official City of Toronto Staff reports, City Council meetings, and Executive Committee reports. This also involved analysing feasibility studies, financial accounts, and deputation statements. Furthermore, I accessed newspaper articles, and online news recordings to broaden the basis of my case study analysis. Some observational information was also included through my personal experience in ongoing public meetings at City Hall where World Expo/International Event agenda items were discussed in 2016.
Within this research, I also conducted semi-structured interviews from varied perspectives and disciplines across the city. These different perspectives provided me with a broad understanding of various outlooks in relation to mega events in Toronto. These interviews uncovered some of the approaches and planning rationales that have been used within mega-event planning in Toronto, while also providing insight on the role of the public throughout these processes.

2.0 Literature Review

2.1 What are Mega Events?

Mega-events, are temporary, high profile events that have an immense popular appeal, large mediated reach, and international meaning (Hall, 1992; Roche, 2000). These spectacles include major fairs, festivals, expositions, and cultural sporting events, and are typically organized by variable combinations of national governmental and international non-governmental organizations (Roche, 2000). Within limited timespans, mega-events like the Olympic games, FIFA World Cup and World Expo, attract thousands of viewers and participants to various host-cities and their urban regions. These events come with significant costs and require extensive planning and organization (Roche, 1994; Mills & Rosentraub, 2013; Müller, 2015). Although these spectacles are temporary and short-lived, mega-events have long lived pre- and post-event dimensions, which influence urban spaces, built environments, and city populations (Greenhalgh, 1988; Roche, 2003).

Mega-events have been widely discussed by academics across the globe. Within scholarly writing, various intellectuals have elaborated over mega-events and their ability to influence urban-regional processes on a global scale (Roche, 2003). Within general academia we
find that there are both positive and negative perspectives when analyzing mega-events. The purpose of the following literature review is to survey the landscape and provide an overview of the existing literature.

### 2.2 Perceived Benefits of Mega-Events

One inquiry regarding mega-events that has been explored by various academics involves the question of why cities and nations aspire to host mega-events. Some scholars have addressed this question by discussing the various perceived benefits that are considered by governments and hosting coalitions when justifying or legitimizing mega-event processes. Arguments for hosting mega-events (although contested) are usually articulated in terms of economic and social benefits for the hosting nation (Horne, 2007).

One perceived benefit examined by various scholars, involves the belief that mega-events can bring substantial enhancements to economies at the neighbourhood, city scale and the national scale. This is often a central rational for bidding for the opportunity to host these events as proponents of mega-events have place significant emphasis on the economic incentives of hosting hallmark events, claiming they can strengthen business markets, create new jobs, bring international investments, and increase tax dollars (Schuster, 2001; Burbank, et al, 2001).

Since the mid-1970’s, with the rise of mass communication technologies, mega-events have garnered unprecedented global audiences. It is estimated that 3.2 billion people tuned in to watch at least one minute of the 2016 Brazil FIFA World Cup (Kantar, 2014). Furthermore, corporate sponsorships & broadcasting rights have brought a significant influx of revenues that is split between event corporations and hosting cities (Horne, 2007). These changes have allowed cities and nations to reach much larger audiences, with the hopes that this exposure will allow
them to capitalize on a successful event through increased tourism and investment (Whitson and Macintosh, 1996; Horne, 2007).

Furthermore, globalization and the economic restructuring of cities have both played influential factors in the attractiveness of mega-events as stimulants to urban economic redevelopment (Roche, 1992; Hiller, 2000; Hall, 2006). Various scholars have argued that mega-events have become a strategic means for many cities trying to increase their competitive position in the globalized economy (Roche, 1994; Hall, 2006; Horne, 2007). One discourse that sheds light on this supposed benefit can be explored through the conceptualizations of capitalist urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989). Since the late twentieth century, urban politics and systems of governance around the world underwent significant changes due to the emergence of a more globally-integrated capitalist economy (Owen, 2002). Scholars like David Harvey (1989) argue that this shift contributed to the transition from a ‘managerial style’ of urban politics to what has been described as an ‘entrepreneurial approach’ (Harvey, 1989; Owen, 2002). A managerial approach to urban politics, often involves policies focused on social welfare and the democratic concerns of public participation and accountability in planning (Harvey, 1989; Owen, 2002). Alternatively, a “new urban politics” of entrepreneurial urban governance involves the direct emphasis on the promotion of local economic development through inter-urban competition strategies (Harvey, 1989; Cox, 1993). With the erosion of economic and fiscal base of many large cities in the advanced capitalist world due to deindustrialization, the theory goes that urban governments must be innovative, entrepreneurial, and willing to explore all kinds of avenues to maintain relevance and secure better economic futures for their populations (Harvey, 1989). Thus, many theorists argue that urban governance has become more oriented in the provision of a "good business climate" and the construction of all sorts of lures to bring capital
into their city (Harvey, 1989; Wood, 1998).

Under this entrepreneurial strategy various cities have used techniques like urban branding, investments in key control and command functions in high finance, the use of technology or information gathering, and even the promotion of consumer attractions sometimes linked to the organization of urban spectacles (Harvey, 1989; Wood, 1998). As Harvey notes, “imagining a city through the organization of spectacular urban spaces became a means to attract capital and people in a period of intensified inter-urban competition” (Harvey, 1989, p. 92).

Within recent global economic trends, mega-events have been perceived as valuable promotional opportunities for cities and regions to showcase their attractiveness in an age of competitive urban entrepreneurialism (Horne, 2007). As a result, various urban regions have promoted mega-events as means to achieve pro-growth strategies, long-term economic development and attract mobile capital (Hiller, 2000).

Another perceived benefit, that has been examined by various scholars, involves this belief that mega-events can be used to raise the profile and international prestige of a city or country. Within the globally-integrated capitalist economy various nations, regions, and cities have used mega-events to promote favorable international images throughout tourist, migration, and business marketplaces (Hall, 2006). Various hosting coalitions have perceived mega-events as opportunities to connect, contribute, and attach specific meanings to place (Kearns and Philo, 1993; Quinn, 2005). As cities and nations seek to differentiate themselves, mega-events often become an entrepreneurial strategy for urban areas to project a unique profile for visitors and investors (Burbank, et al, 2001). This facilitates integrationist tendencies of the global economy that encourage places to recreate and reproduce itself with the sole intention of attracting flows of capital (Quinn, 2005; Hall 2006). These profiles and urban images have even become a form
of ‘place marketing’ that bring inward investments to cities and their nations (Kearns and Philo, 1993; Hiller, 2000). Through the symbolism of a high-profile spectacles, mega-events have been promoted as opportunities to enhance business linkages, tourist attractiveness, and building the prestige of local products (Horne, 2007).

Some scholars have even claimed that international events have become one of the most powerful and effective vehicles for gaining exposure as an attractive tourist destination and for the creation of “destination images” (Whitson & Macintosh, 1996; Jenkins, 1999). With their global media exposure, various urban regions have pursued hallmark events for their ability to promote favorable city experiences and re-imaging urban regions as places with things to see and do (Rowe & Stevenson, 1994).

The use of hallmark events as a means to distribute an urban or national profile can be observed throughout numerous event agendas, including early mega-events like the World’s Fairs. Various scholars derive mega-events from the 1851-1939 period where various iconic International Exhibitions were staged in cities like London, Paris, and Chicago. These three to six month exhibitions attracted thousands of visitors from all around the world while displaying a wide variety of industrial, scientific, and cultural items from different nationalities (Findling, 2011). National governments at the time understood that major expos, if successful, would offer the projection of positive images of their nations on a domestic and international platform (Roche, 1998). Inter-country and inter-city competitiveness (London & Paris, France and America) was also evident throughout these early mega-events as nations would attempt to improve and outdo successful elements from previous Expos (Roche, 2003). Scholars like Bennett (1996) and Roach (1998) argue that these International Exhibitions where more than just a display of technological and cultural marvels, but used to symbolize the legitimacy, viability
and progressiveness of a nation’s ideals, power and control, towards domestic and international publics (Roche, 1998). In “The Exhibitionary Complex,” Tony Bennett (1996) uses Michel Foucault’s framework of power/knowledge to address the politics of power within the medium of the exhibition (Roche, 1998). Bennett argues that the exhibition “formed vehicles for inscribing and broadcasting the messages of power throughout society” (Bennett, 1996; Roach, 1998). Through this discourse, we observe how World’s Fairs were used to influence the social constructions of various public cultures by distributing nationalist power ideals to mass audiences amongst local populations and visitors from around the globe. Early mega-events were used to communicate ideological messages and cultural meanings pertaining to empire, race, and the state on a local and global scale (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009).

When analysing contemporary mega-events, many scholars have also documented the ways in which hallmark events are still perceived as strategies for urban regions wanting to raise their international profile and prestige. Since the 1950’s, hosting international events has become one of the most appealing methods for countries to temporarily place themselves on the world stage and showcase themselves as successful societies (Whitson & Macintosh, 1996). Some examples involve the 1980 Olympic Games where the Soviet Union proclaimed the achievements of the socialist path to development, the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games where the virtues of free enterprise and capitalism were restated, and many other events like the Brazil Olympics which were attempts to verify national world class status (Whitson & Macintosh, 1996; Sanchez & Broudehoux, 2013). Even if these events are not completely successful, Hall (2006) argues that mega-events direct massive media attention to the cultural capital of cities which aspire to be ‘world class’. When trying to improve a city’s image these events can be used to influence cultural identities, nationalist discourses, and existing social performances (Hiller,
Mega-events are also perceived by various city governments as catalysts for urban development, urban renewal and the revitalization of city spaces. Many countries and cities have strategically hosted hallmark events believing it would force governments and citizens to advance needed city infrastructure, focus resources, and acquire needed funds from higher forms of governments (Whitson & Macintosh, 1996; Nixon, et al, 2016). For example, the 1992 Barcelona Olympics Games attracted public investments of US$6.2 billion which helped to redevelop the city and the province of Catalonia (Malfas et al., 2004; Horne, 2007). Governing bodies, like the IOC or FIFA, encourage such transformative legacy impacts to justify the high expenditures of mega-events (Hiller, 2000; Muller, 2015). On a city scale proponents of mega-events also view these events as means to construct or upgrade stadia, conference facilities, roads, railway lines, hotels and other city infrastructure (Muller, 2015). The fixed deadlines of event timetables are thought to prevent stalling and accelerate developmental transformation (Hiller, 2000). Various urban governments often leverage these events to realize projects that under ordinary circumstances would be overly expensive or hampered by bureaucratic delay (Hall, 2006).

One discourse that sheds light on the relationship between mega-events and urban development can be explored through Logan and Molotch’s work on the Growth Machine thesis. Under this theory, elite coalitions of actors and organizations (i.e. growth machines) that share an interest in local growth and its effects on land values, compete amongst other growth machines for scarce mobile capital investment, as they attempt to gain local support for such urban growth (Rodgers, 2009). Under this theory, the city is a growth machine, in which growth consensus is at the center of its vision and the main purpose for local governments and communities (Logan &
Molotch, 1987). It argues that growth tactics are needed within urban processes to bring economic and social benefits for its citizens and the betterment of urban spaces (Logan & Molotch, 1987). In this context, growth is portrayed as a public good that increases economic activity and helps the development of cities (Logan & Molotch, 2007, pg. 33). This emphasis on urban growth taken by various North American cities informs why various urban regions engage with mega-event strategies, which provide ideal platforms for local development agendas that are promoted as a “public good” (Logan & Molotch, 1987; Rodgers, 2009). Such pursuit of growth not only shapes the local political system but also influences city development and the re-imagining of spaces and place competitiveness (Hall, 2006).

Many governments and hosting coalitions have even argued that hallmark events can also foster civic enthusiasm and pride across a region. Mega-events can provide the sharing of civic virtues and jingoism through the representation of national and cultural identities (Hiller, 2000, pg. 453).

### 2.3 Potential Negative Effects of Mega-Events

Despite these viewpoints, other academics have shed light on some of the drawbacks that derive from hosting mega-events. Scholars like Horne (2007) have argued that mega-events cannot be absolute solutions for social and economic problems within cities. Some shortcomings that result from hosting mega events involve overpromising benefits, underestimating costs, dismissal of existing city priorities, public risk taking, suspension of regular rule of law, inequitable distribution of resources, and underdeveloped quick fix strategies (Horne, 2007; Muller, 2014). Scholars like Müller (2014), have termed these complex of symptoms as ‘the mega-event syndrome’.
One drawback discussed by various scholars involves the large costs that come with the planning and implementation of hallmark events. Scholars have outlined that hallmark events now regularly require more than USD $10 billion in capital investment (Muller, 2014). The global trend in mega-event production suggests that these projects leave communities with massive debt resulting in financial losses for the hosting region (Gaffney, 2010; Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012). Some academics have also pointed out that most mega-event proposals tend to overstate the potential economic benefits of a hallmark event (Hiller, 2000; Baade & Matheson, 2004; Horne, 2007). For example, since 1960s every Olympic Games had gone over budget with an average cost overrun of 179% (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012; Muller, 2014). Furthermore, every World Cup since 1994 has experienced net economic losses (Baade & Matheson, 2004; Gaffney, 2010; Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012; Muller, 2014). These gaps between forecasted economic rewards and actual outcomes can create challenges for urban areas in advanced and developing societies (Horne, 2007).

In other instances, academics have noticed how mega-event processes create unequal distribution of costs and benefits within hosting regions (Logan & Molotch, 1987; Muller, 2014). While property developers, construction firms, corporate interests, and politicians may profit from these events, many members of the general public don’t always benefit in the same manner (Muller, 2014).

Many scholars have critiqued the use of mega-events as instruments of hegemonic power, that are designed to appease popular opinion, win public support, legitimize imperialist policies and neutralize opposition to pro-growth agendas (Broudehoux, 2007; Rydell, 2013; Gotham, 2016). This approach to shift the attention away from everyday social problems and pacify local people is a form of ideological manipulation that can be referred as “bread and circuses”
(Eisinger, 2000; Gotham, 2016). This expression originates from a Roman satirist Juvenal which implies that through the diversion, distraction, and implementation of spectacles (bread and circuses) public approval and consent can be manufactured amongst oppressed societies by systems of governance (Gotham, 2016). According to Eisinger (2000) the notion of bread and circuses can also be used to express the trend of building cities as an “entertainment venue” instead of delivering quality-of-life interests that serve its citizens. Furthermore, as these events require large capital funds, which usually involve public monies, many communities question why quality-of-life interests are replaced for the hosting of large spectacles (Haxton, 1999). Considering the massive amount of money that are used when hosting these events, local opposition coalitions usually question how these funds could be better used (Lenskyj, 2000; 2008). Many individuals and communities have perceived these events as a misplacement of priorities and a total disregard to local citizens and their interests (Lenskyj, 2000; 2008). When local citizens lack adequate housing, food and other subsistence needs, organizing a ‘circus’ when people need ‘bread’ will always appear inappropriate (Hiller, 2000; Lenskyj, 2000; 2008).

Mega-events have played influential roles in the development of various urban spaces around the world nevertheless, some scholars have shed light on some of the negative ramifications mega-events have over the productions of urban space. One drawback discussed by various scholars involves the tendency of mega-events to produce developments that do not fit the contexts in which they are situated (Horne, 2007; Gaffney, 2010). This involves developments, like stadiums, media centers, and infrastructure projects that are used for the functions of an event, but do not fit the demands of a region after the events are over. These “white elephants” involve massive building projects that require high servicing and maintenance costs which significantly outweigh its value on an everyday use (Alm, et al., 2016).
Other scholars have examined how mega-events can overtake urban development processes within their host cities. Instead of a mega-event becoming a mechanism for urban development, urban development often become the instrument for the event (Muller, 2014). One example involves the urban development of Rio de Janeiro which hosted the American Games (2007), the Football World Cup (2014), and the Olympic Games (2016). The result of the city’s urban structure, which took place over two decades, was “purely driven by sporting events” (Kassens-Noor, 2012, p. 105; Muller, 2014). Instead of improving housing, community facilities, or public transport, mega-event development can take over existing priorities within an urban region (Muller, 2014).

Other scholars, have critiqued the temporality of urban spectacles which have implications on the production of city spaces (Gotham; 2005; Johansson et al, 2011). During the preparation of event hosting, the city is rearranged and recreated for a temporary timeframe. Unwanted city elements are removed, streets are closed off, buildings are redeveloped, substitute spaces are opened and extra-ordinary performances are staged, which replace the day-to-day activities that actually occur in those spaces (Gotham, 2005; Johansson, et al., 2011). These urban spectacles can often result in inauthentic “representational space” (i.e. imaginations, ideals) which can overshadow existing spatial practices (i.e. daily routine and urban reality) (Lefebvre, 1991; Gotham 2011).

Scholars like Gaffney (2010) have also critiqued the ways in which mega-events can transform urban landscapes into governable spaces which attempt to structure both material and discursive social relations. This can involve social programs used throughout mega-events which instill codes of ethics and behavioral norms throughout society (Gaffney, 2010). An example was explored by Gaffney (2010) as he examined the negative transformation of social behaviors in
space through social discipline tactics instilled by mega-event coalitions in Brazil (Gaffney, 2010).

Other negative spatial effects that have been discussed by academics involves the production of spaces that are militarized, exclusionary or gentrified throughout mega-event processes. Scholars have documented various instances where mega-events were used to redevelop or reimagine a space, which as a result lead to the displacement or removal of thousands of individuals (Olds, 1998; Broudehoux, 2007; Lenskyj, 2008). One extreme example was explored by the Center on Human Rights and Evictions (COHRE) which estimated that a total of 1.5 million Beijing residents were displaced by mega-event developments (COHRE, 2007).

One important framework that must be considered when exploring mega-event processes involves conceptualizations of neoliberalism. According to Hall (2006) neoliberalism has become one of the major frameworks by which the experience of urban development is understood. Neoliberal ideology is based on the belief that “open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference represent the optimal mechanism for economic development” (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 350). As explored by Harvey neoliberalism within urbanism involves “mantras of private and personal responsibility and initiative, deregulation, privatization, liberalization of markets, free trade, downsizing of government, draconian cutbacks in the welfare state and its protections” (Harvey 2000, p. 176; Keil, 2002). Neoliberalism is not a “monolithic affair”, but “exists through the practices and ideologies of variously scaled fragments of ruling classes, who impose their specific projects onto respective territories and spheres of influence” (Keil, 2002, p. 582). The neoliberal framework can structure the objectives of community development, definitions of the public
good, and definitions of citizenship in order to transform an urban space into a place that is desirable within the capitalist economy. Due to neoliberal approaches, Hall argues that urban redevelopment under mega-event planning has typically resulted in the development of structures and powers of governance that are unaccountable to public stakeholders and participation (Owen, 2002; Hall, 2006).

For many growth coalitions, mega-events have become a mechanism for urban developments that benefit private interests competing within the urban entrepreneurial capitalist economy (Hall, 2006). Pro-growth coalitions and inter-urban competitiveness has driven corporate interests to take advantage of mega-events as means to reimagine urban space for capitalist gain, which don’t always benefit the public interest (Hall, 2006). Scholars like Muller (2014) have discussed that mega-event planning tends to privilege local business, real estate interests, global corporations, and elitist coalitions. (Logan & Molotch, 1987, Burbank, et al., 2001).

Other scholars have critiqued mega-events for the commodification and inauthentic representations of cultures that occur during hallmark event processes. Scholars like McClinclchey (2008) have critiqued this commodification of culture throughout festivals which lead to inauthentic representations of a heritage within space. Within the experience economy, the city becomes “a site of use, symbolism and experience” which is to be consumed (Marling et al., 2009, p. 870). The consumption of culture, which makes ethnic diversities a commodity up for sale has increasingly been recognized as a source for economic gain (McClinchey, 2008). Through international events many ethnic cultures in neighbourhoods have become commoditized, packaged for consumption, and put up for sale (Quinn, 2005). A local study conducted by Hackworth & Rekers (2005), Ethnic Packaging and Gentrification: The Case of
"Four Neighborhoods in Toronto," alludes to this notion as they examined the use of ethnic neighbourhood festivals as a form of ethnic branding for local business communities. Another Canadian example involved the unauthentic representation and appropriation of indigenous cultures throughout the 2010 Winter Olympics, (i.e., the use of indigenous imagery on Olympic logos and stadia without consent, and the false interpretations of indigenous culture throughout Olympic activities) (O'Bonsawin, 2009). Scholars like O'Bonsawin (2009), have shed light on how cultures that are marginalized and discriminated on a day-to-day basis can be commodified for mega-event spectacles. Within international mega-events culture is used as a marketing tool to promote capitalist and business interests within the city (Qadeer, 1997).

Other scholars have explored how mega-events allow coalitions of political and economic agents to qualify a hosting region into a ‘city of exception’ (Vainer, 2011; Sanchez & Broudehoux, 2013). This concept draws from Agamben’s (2005) notion over the ‘state of exception’, which is a theory that describes the suspension of laws in times of crisis and emergency when facing unexpected necessities (Sanchez & Broudehoux, 2013). These states of exception allow hosting cities to bypass democratic political processes, suspend established procedures, and lift restrictions, to facilitate the acceleration of various events-related processes (Sanchez & Broudehoux, 2013).

Scholars like Sanchez and Broudehoux (2013), have examined how politicians and economic elites have instrumentalized ‘states of crisis’ to accelerate large development projects, adopt neo-liberal urban policies, and remake the city in their own image. This event-led planning model fosters an exclusive vision of urban regeneration that serves the needs of capital while exacerbating socio-spatial segregation, inequality, and social conflicts (Sanchez & Broudehoux, 2013). These states of exception also involve the imposition of temporary, extra-legal forms of
governance that disappear once the moment of crisis has passed (Sanchez & Broudehoux, 2013).

Many mega-event processes involve these states of exception which suspend the regular rules of an area to facilitate the hosting of a mega-event (Muller, 2014). These exceptions can excuse laws over taxation, immigration, property rights, urban planning, and freedom of speech (Muller, 2014). Scholars have also critiqued how events like the Olympics or World Cup enforce their own legislations to fast-track development and regulate the activities and behaviours of visitors at the event sites (Chalkley & Essex, 1999; Hall, 2006; Lenskyj, 2008).

Through this review, we can observe different perspectives in relation to mega-events under an urban framework. Although promoters have boosted various perceived benefits that come from the hosting of a hallmark event, various scholars have demonstrated some of the drawbacks that can negatively impact an urban region. With this in mind, it is also important to consider some of the literature that delves into understandings of urban planning especially where it correlates to mega-events processes.

### 2.4 Urban Planning

For many, urban planning is understood as a specialized, partly professionalized practice, which engages with the strategic regulation and management of various economic social and environmental aspects of the built environment and the productions of space (Huxley, 2009). According to the Canadian Institute of Planners, “planning can be understood as the scientific, aesthetic, and orderly disposition of land, resources, facilities and services with a view to securing the physical, economic and social efficiency, health and well-being of urban and rural communities” (CIP, 2015). In this frame of thought urban planning decisions are based on technical competencies and rationalistic ideals. This approach requires scientific and rational
reasoning when engaging in the strategic regulation and management of socioeconomic and environmental aspects of the production of space. It is predicated on the assumption that better evidence necessarily leads to better results and should be given priority (Davoudi, 2015).

Interestingly, some scholars, applying a Marxist critique, believe that urban planning is an ideological activity that serves the interests of local capital and dominant class fractions that promote myths of local governmental rationality and civic harmony, in order to legitimize the socially divisive character of the capitalist system (Castells 1978; Harvey 1985; Logan and Molotch 1986; Roche, 1994).

Nevertheless, other scholars have argued that planning is a complex activity pertinent to everyone who has a vested interest in “environmental” spaces and what happens to them (Purcell, 2002. Mitchell, 2003; Brenner, et, al., 2012). It involves a particular kind of everyday human practice that is shaped by democratic decision-making. Scholars have argued that planning is an intrinsically political endeavor which provides a set of social functions (Klosterman, 1985; Tewdwr-Jones, 2012). Planning can be understood as a democratic process that involves contentious decisions. We must thus understand that planning practice involves more than technical competence but also involves political and social power. Planning cannot only be concerned with rationalist ordering of land use organization, but must also involve the public interest. Urban planning as a field has a social and political role in advocating for the public interest, improving the information base for public and private decision-making, and advancing the greater good (Klosterman, 1985; Lennon, 2015). Based on these approaches planning requires both technical rationality and democratic approaches to optimize its functionality and legitimacy (Arnstein 1969; Klosterman, 1985; Roche, 1992). For the purpose of this paper, we must examine what a democratic approach consists of and why it is vital within
the urban planning process.

2.5 Public Participation in Planning

One essential component of a democratic planning process involves the action of public participation. As argued by Davidoff (1965) “If the planning process is to encourage democratic urban government then it must operate…to include rather than exclude citizens from participation in the process” (p. 332). Public participation within an urban planning context refers to approaches that advocate for the involvement of communities and citizens within urban planning and other decision-making processes. Since the 1960s, increased pressure from citizens and stakeholder groups have altered traditional top-down urban planning decision-making within cities (Jackson, 2001). Public participation is a process by which people are enabled to become actively involved in defining issues that concern them, in formulating and implementing policies, planning, and developing and delivering strategies to achieve change (Lichfield, 1996; Marzuki, 2015, p. 23). Planners and decision-makers have acknowledged that involving affected people can identify alternative values and solutions, resolve inequities in land allocation, increase fairness in decision making, reduce conflict, and ultimately lead to better decisions and more sustainable environmental management (Jackson, 2001). Public involvement encourages the input of citizens within planning processes and presents the views and needs of entire communities relating to specific issues (Marzuki, 2015).

Nevertheless, participatory planning is not a unitary concept (Hodge, 2008). Sherry Arnstein has distinguished between different forms and degrees of citizen participation. In her essay “A Ladder of Citizen Participation” (1969), she explores eight forms of citizen participation, not all of which involve decision-making power. Arnstein’s influential article
points to the existence of multiple approaches to participation in theory and practice. As Arnstein phrased it, “there is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcomes of the process” (Arnstein, 1969, p. 216; Lane, 2005). According to this view, unless citizens have a genuine opportunity to affect outcomes, participation is not genuine or valid (Arnstein 1969; Jackson, 2000; Lane, 2005). To ensure that the public interest is reflected in urban decisions, the public should participate in the making of final decisions and not just be given the opportunity to comment on proposed decisions (Arnstein 1969; Kweit and Kweit 1987; Shannon 1990). Thus, “public involvement becomes a continuous process, no longer a series of discrete events’’ (Behan, 1988, p. 47).

Other scholars have elaborated on some of the drawbacks of participatory planning. Since it requires time, socioeconomic resources, and the management of people and information, public participation is arguably more challenging to implement, and as a result less frequently executed, or simply adopted in name only (Haxton, 2003; Gursoy & Kendall, 2006). Public participation is often deemed as a time-consuming endeavor, that has the potential to slow down decision-making as publics require adequate information and education to meaningfully participate in administrative processes (Marzuki, 2015). Other academics point out the limitations of citizen input as effectiveness may be compromised by the difficulties faced by the public when understanding the complexities of planning technical reports and jargon (Jenkins, 1999). Bramwell and Sharman (1999) also point out to the challenges of public participation when residents are not equally represented within stakeholder groups, and dominated by specific coalitions.

Scholars like Lane (2005), argue that the role of public participation is largely determined by existing power structures and the nature of planning enterprises being undertaken. The
definitions of planning problems, the kind of knowledge used in the planning practice, and the conceptualizations of planning, and power relations determine the extent participation is offered to the public (Lane, 2005). The success of the process depends on how far the public is allowed to be involved (Hashim, 1986; Lukic, 2011).

Over the last decade or so, movements and scholars have deployed the term “right to the city” to capture, among other things, the importance of citizen participation in urban processes (Lefebvre, 1968). There has been a lot of debate over the meaning of this term. It originally derives from a book by Henri Lefebvre, who wrote it just before the proto-revolutionary mobilizations in Paris in 1968. Drawing on Lefebvre, scholars like Purcell (2003), for example have argued that citizens should play a central role in any decision that contributes to the production of urban space. This involves participation in decisions made by the state, capital, and multilateral institutions, which affect the production of space in a particular city (Purcell, 2003). Purcell also argues that the ‘right to the city’ advocates for the need to restructure power relations in order to shift control from capital and the state to urban inhabitants (2003). The ‘right to the city’ must include more than merely the rights to exist and to satisfy basic needs, but must be open for transformations and opportunities in everyday life (Schmid, 2012).

Within this review of literature, we can understand this argument that urban planning must involve a democratic participatory role within its decision-making processes. Public involvement is a key element in the development of any successful urban area. As mega-event processes usually intersect with urban development processes, it is important to consider what approaches are used within hosting processes.
2.6 Political vs. Democratic Approaches to Mega-Events

Within academia various scholars have examined sources of resistance in relation to hallmark events (Lenskyj, 2008; Cottrell, 2011, Gotham, 2016). One of these sources derives from the lack of accountability, transparency, and public engagement that is often seen in various mega-event hosting processes (Kidd, 1992; Flyvbjerg, 2003; Lenskyj, 2008; Gotham, 2011). These forms of resistance critique the undemocratic nature of decision-making processes found in various hallmark events, which are often organized by selective groups without the approval of varying public interests (Kidd, 1992; Gotham, 2011). As mega-events are often portrayed by proponents and organizers as civic events, which involve public funds and spaces, scholars have questioned the often minimal role of the public within the planning processes (Roche, 1994; Haxton, 1999).

While examining public involvement in hallmark events, some theorists have argued that mega-event planning processes have traditionally taken on a “political approach” (Roche, 1994; Gursoy & Kendall, 2006). According to Roche (1994) the word “political” here does not reflect the planning ideals of a democratic or community-based planning processes, but instead the opposite. Hall (1989) has argued that “hallmark events are not the result of a rational decision-making process. Decisions affecting the hosting and the nature of hallmark events grow out of a political process. The process involves the values of actors (individuals, interest groups, and organizations) in a struggle for power” (p. 219). Through these political approaches there is typically little democratic community input, and decisions are largely determined by the will and power of urban political leaderships or powerful urban elite groups (Roche, 1994). This approach can be exemplified in what Veal (1994) refers to as “hallmark decision-making” where the decision to proceed with projects are made first, while attempts to justify such decisions are
made at a later date (1994, p. 68; Haxton, 1999). These tactics involve a highly charged political exercise, requiring constant negotiation and consensus building from those in the leadership (Kidd, 1992).

Some scholars have found that many mega-event coalitions prefer to act under a “political approach” due to the risks that threaten to delay mega-event planning and construction processes that come with democratic processes and its demands. (Boudreau et al., 2001; Hiller, 2000; Raco, 2014; Muller, 2015). Some event-governing bodies perceive democratic decision-making as a nuisance, delaying and derailing the preparations for an event (Muller, 2015). An example of this notion can be observed through Jérôme Valcke, a Secretary General of FIFA, which stated in 2014, “less democracy is sometimes better for organizing a World Cup” (Reuters, 2014).

Due to the willingness of many mega-event coalitions to adopt a “political approach” throughout hosting processes, scholars have elaborated over the various forms of resistance and opposition that have emerged from local populations (Haxton, 1999; Lenskyj, 2008; Gotham, 2016). Scholars like (Lenskyj, 2000, 2008) have examined various community groups that have critiqued mega-event processes, for their anti-democratic nature and omission of public interests. As Lenskyj (2000) has argued, mega-event coalitions have often tried to “manufacture consent” using tactics like controlling the news and tokenistic participation. These efforts include “reaching out” and “engaging” with local residents, in which pro-hosting coalitions promote mega-event development as major benefits for entire urban regions (Horne, 2007; Lenskyj, 2008; Gotham, 2016). Community concerns like the reality of purported mega-event benefits and whether they outweigh potential negative impacts are often omitted within anti-participatory political approaches (Haxton, 1999).
Many theorists have advocated for the need of a participatory democratic approach within mega-event planning. A democratic planning approach involves the process of joint decision-making amongst independent key stakeholders which attempts to resolve and manage problems and issues related to large planning processes (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). This approach combines technical rationality and participatory democracy throughout the overall process (Kidd, 1992; Haxton, 1999; Gursoy & Kendall, 2006).

Several researchers suggest that even before submitting a bid for hosting, organizers should solicit inputs from several community groups to prompt public debate and promote community involvement, to create a more accountable, transparent, and inclusive process (Lenskyj, 1992; French and Disher, 1997; Gursoy & Kendall, 2006). Public discussions on the expected benefits and costs and widespread community involvement are likely to result in a broad public consensus over how to reduce negative impacts and increase benefits (Gursoy & Kendall, 2006). As discussed prior, democratic processes allow citizens to have a role within ongoing planning processes and the right to have an influence on the production of their urban spaces. As any planning processes, democratic approaches should also be used within mega-event planning processes to ensure ongoing processes serve the public interest (Davidoff, 1965; Klosterman, 1985). One main component for democratic approaches involves the use of participatory engagement. Although a more democratic approach for mega-event planning is more challenging to implement in practice, thus less frequently executed, public involvement within mega-event planning allows for the involvement of affected people to identify solutions and work towards collaborative and ethical decisions (Haxton, 1999; Jackson, 2000; Gursoy & Kendall, 2006).

Through this discourse, we view the benefits of a democratic process within mega-events,
which advocate for the meaningful contribution of various publics within the planning of mega-events. Democratic participatory approaches are key components for any successful and ethical mega-event planning process.

2.7 Overview

Through reviewing the literature, it is clear that mega-events can have major influence over urban spaces, built environments, and city populations (Greenhalgh, 1988; Roche, 2003; Horne, 2007; Muller, 2014). The scholarship on mega-events highlights positive and negative perspectives of mega-events. On one side, various governments and hosting coalitions have promoted mega events as an urban strategy for urban development in an age of neoliberal urban entrepreneurialism. However, these strategies have encountered much criticism from opposing coalitions that challenge the negative ramifications mega-events can have on existing economies, cultures, social life, and the productions of space (Hall, 2006; Lenskyj, 2008; Muller, 2014).

Furthermore, this review sheds light on the approaches that have been used within mega-event planning processes. Scholars have argued that various hosting coalitions have used a “political approach” when planning hallmark events. This approach lacks transparency and involves minimal democratic community input as decisions are largely determined by the will and power of urban political leaderships or urban elite groups (Roche, 1994).

Nevertheless, within this review we can observe that “democratic approaches” must be used within mega-event planning. Some academics consider democratic processes which serve the public interest, as a core value for the urban planning practice (Davidoff, 1965; Klosterman, 1985). Any planning process must involve a democratic participatory role within its decision-making processes. A democratic participatory planning approach involves joint decision-making
amongst citizens which attempt to resolve and manage problems and issues within ongoing planning processes (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). This involves transparent, accountable, and inclusive processes which allow all citizens to have an opportunity to influence ongoing decision-making processes. Within mega-event planning, using democratic approaches can allow affected people to identify alternative values and solutions, resolve inequities, and increase fairness in decision making (Jackson, 2001).

Therefore, through this review we can understand that democratic participatory approaches are key components for any successful and ethical mega-event planning process. In the next chapter I will explore what approaches have been used in Toronto’s history when engaging with mega-event processes.

3. Mega-Events Processes in Toronto History

3.1 Toronto Mega-Event Case Studies

Toronto is recognized as one of the most multicultural and cosmopolitan cities in the world that functions as a center of business, finance, arts and culture (Beaverstock et al, 1999; Qadeer, 2016). Within the last few decades this urban region has had an interesting relationship to international events and mega-event processes. While in Toronto’s history, the city has hosted numerous events that have many of the characteristics of mega-events, such as the 2015 Toronto Pan Am games, Toronto International Film Festival, Caribbean Carnival, Taste of the Danforth Festival, the SARS Benefit Concert, the city has yet to host a global hallmark event (Hall, 1992). Although there have been various efforts and attempts to bring a mega-event to the city, these proposals have encountered various challenges and forms of resistance from many groups stressing the potential dangers of hosting such mega-events.
In this chapter, I will be exploring three case studies from Toronto’s history: the 1996 Olympic Bid, the 2008 Olympic Bid, and the 2025 World Expo pre-bid process. The 1996 and 2008 Olympic bids represent two of the most influential mega-event bidding processes in Toronto’s history, which have been greatly discussed by academics, professionals, and various forms of media. The 2025 World Expo pre-bid was one of the city’s most recent attempts at hosting a mega-event, which inspired interesting perspectives on Toronto’s current relationship to hallmark events. These case studies provide interesting opportunities for analysis, as they mobilized massive debates about Toronto as a city and its urban context. They also allow the opportunity to compare how Toronto has approached mega-event bidding and planning over the last three decades. In this chapter I will summarize the processes of the 1996 Olympic Bid, the 2008 Olympic Bid, and the 2025 World Expo pre-bid, and work to uncover the planning and participatory approaches that were utilized in each of these processes. I hope to also uncover some of the challenges that prevented democratic approaches from taking place during these mega-event processes. I argue that one of these challenges that must be considered involves the dominance of hegemonic neoliberal market-oriented ideals throughout mega-event planning which prevent participatory involvement.

3.2 1996 Olympic Bid

The initiative for the 1996 Toronto Olympic bid originated in the mid-1980s from a citizens group known as the Toronto Ontario Olympic Council (TOOC), which was led by Paul Henderson and former Olympians and interested athletes (Kidd, 1992). The claimed objective of the TOOC was to bring the Olympics to Toronto as the organizers believed that the time was right for the city to express its world class status and demonstrate its unique qualities to the
world (TOOC, 1986). After submitting a privately commissioned feasibility study in August 1986, the TOOC was declared by the Toronto City Council as the official agent for the Olympic bid (Kidd, 1992). Henderson initially stated that he wanted “as little input as possible from the various levels of government” and that the Games be understood as a “private enterprise and not be done with tax money” (Christie, 1986, June 14). In 1987, the Canadian Olympic Association selected Toronto as the Canadian representative for the upcoming bid, with the federal and provincial governments also expressing their support (Kidd, 1992).

Proponents of the bid, which included the TOOC and some politicians, often promoted the economic and social benefits of the Olympic games for the city. Claimed economic benefits involved over one billion dollars in economic impacts, over 25,000 jobs, over $160 million in government tax revenues, potential inward investments, and increased tourist and business activity (TOOC, 1986). The TOOC claimed that the Games would be modeled after the highly successful 1984 Los Angeles Olympic which resulted in a surplus of more than $200 million (Toronto Star, 1986, March 2). Furthermore, the claimed social impacts included a legacy of new and improved sports facilities and venues, the enhancement and recognition of cultural activities, and positive life experiences for Toronto residents (TOOC, 1986). Event boosters strongly believed that by using an appropriate strategy and planning approach the Olympic Games would bring substantial net economic and social benefits (TOOC, 1986). The TOOC and local politicians also argued that the city possessed the necessary infrastructure, resource, energy, and security arrangements to stage the summer games (TOOC, 1986; Toronto Star, 1986, June 16). The venue concept of the TOOC comprised of a network of existing/refurbished/and new facilities, most of which would be focused in downtown Toronto throughout spaces like the Skydome and Exhibition Stadium. They believed that the city could easily provide wide-ranging
venue facilities, extensive accommodations, functioning transportation systems, and top-rated communications capabilities that were required for the mega-event (TOOC, 1986). Some councillors at City Hall also viewed the games as an urban regeneration strategy for the city region. In an interview, Councillor Grys stated “If anyone on council does not support it they’ll be totally irresponsible…they’re talking about bringing $2 Billion over 25 years [for urban redevelopment]” (Byers, 1986). Although the City Council unanimously approved Toronto’s interest in hosting the 1996 Games with a 20-0 vote, endorsement for the event was not as unanimous throughout the city.

During the 1980’s, Toronto was experiencing drastic changes across its socioeconomic and geopolitical structures. These urban shifts involved transformations in its economic base, existing corporate models, and political structures, which derived from new approaches in urban governance experienced by capitalist societies moving towards entrepreneurial stances (Harvey, 1989; Peck and Tickell 2002; Oliver, 2017). The emergence of a “New Urban Politics” created “a gradual shift away from distributive policies, welfare considerations, and direct service provision towards more market-oriented and market dependent approaches aimed at pursuing economic promotion and competitive restructuring” (Swyngedouw et al. 2002 pg. 547—548; Oliver, 2017). The language and logic of public-private partnerships, inter-urban competition, and government-sponsored intervention were becoming commonplace within post-industrial societies (Harvey, 1989; Peck and Tickell 2002; Oliver, 2017). During the 1980s and 1990’s, Toronto would lose much of its manufacturing base which had historically played a key role in the Canadian economy (Lemon, 1991; Olds, 1998). The industrial base was replaced with an economy based on finance, insurance, and real estate along with a concurrent growth in the low paying service sector which transformed Toronto into a city of extremes with respect to wealth,
lifestyle, and housing choice (Olds, 1998). Shifts also involved the provincial offloading of
decision making and responsibilities for responding to urban socioeconomic challenges to lower-
level municipal governments and subsequent decisions to make cut backs to assisted housing,
social services and public programs from the province (Donald, 2002b). By 1988, Toronto’s
homeless population grew to more than 20,000 individuals while 200,000 individuals lived in
sub-standard housing complexes (Kidd, 1992; Borowy, 1992; Olds, 1998). It was also estimated
that 80,000 Torontonians depended on food banks to live on a day-to-day basis (Olds, 1998).

With these urban conditions in play and the realization that the Games could determine
the cities agenda for the next decade, two groups entered the mega-event process in the hopes of
influencing the outcome (Kidd, 1992). One group, to examine and scrutinize TOOC’s lobbying
efforts, involved senior bureaucrats at City Hall, who wanted to ensure that the games did not
hamper the social agenda and goals of the city, and that the bid truly protected the public interest
(Kidd, 1992). On January 1989, City Hall formed the Olympic Task Force (OTF), which
composed of department heads, to analyze and inspect TOOC’s bureaucratic reports. The OTF
was to address a wide range of issues including finance, environmental impacts, public
involvement processes, and housing impacts of the TOOC bid (Olds, 1998). The head of the
Task Force was also appointed to the TOOC, to facilitate greater City involvement (Olds, 1998).

The second group, comprised of inner-city social housing activists, church groups and
labour organizations, joined together to create an alliance called the Bread Not Circus Coalition
(BNCC, 1990). Many local community groups had become impatient with the perceived ‘closed
shop’ mentality of the TOOC organizers within the bid process (Olds, 1998). Furthermore,
previous Canadian Olympic experiences like the Montreal Olympic games, which resulted in
$3.5 billion in net losses, also fostered much skepticism over the bid (BNCC, 1990; Lenskyj,
Various grassroots activists opposed the idea of hosting the Olympic Games in an attempt to shift the city’s focus away from mega-projects to existing challenges in poverty, homelessness, and social justice (BNCC, 1990; Kidd, 1992). They ultimately questioned why necessities like social services, community resources, social equity and environmental goals needed to depend on the hosting of the Olympic games (Kidd, 1992).

It is important to consider that the TOOC was granted about 3.9 million dollars (39% of the TOOC final budget) from Federal and Provincial governments to cover costs associated with the bid (City of Toronto, 1989a). The budget for the Toronto bid, as of May 1989, was “14.6 million (CAN); corporate sponsorship (either cash or in-kind) accounted for $7.9 million and the balance of $6.7 million came from the three levels of government” (Lenskyj, 2000). Groups like the BNCC would critique this use of public funds and express their opposition for such public expenditures (BNCC, 1990; Lenskyj, 2000).

In September 1989, City Council adopted a document called The Toronto Olympic Commitment (TOC) which derived from the OTF and City politicians (Kidd, 1992; Olds, 1998). The TOC was a set of principles that would influence the way the bid was organized and ensure that if Toronto was awarded the Games, the city could plan and stage an equitable, affordable Olympics that would leave a legacy for all Canadians (Olds, 1998). The purpose of the TOC was to broaden the public goals of the bid and to include pressing needs into the Olympic project (Kidd 1992). There were five main categories of commitments: (1) Social Equity; (2) Environment; (3) Financial Guarantees; (4) A Healthy Olympics; (5) Jobs and the Olympics (TOC, 1989). The TOC was to ensure that all “Olympic” housing would become affordable after the games, enhance gender equality, improve access to recreation, maximize unionized jobs, guarantee Federal and Provincial commitments in any financial risks, to submit all major
construction projects to environmental assessments, respect current planning policies and more (TOC, 1989). The TOOC, and Paul Henderson, would later comment that the TOC was a needless “political”, “unnecessary and troublesome” interjections made to the Olympic bid (Olds, 1998, p. 33).

The TOC identified several initiatives that aimed to facilitate public participation in the planning process of the Olympics. These involved evening public meetings; descriptive information in different languages; community meetings in neighborhoods and public meetings with the executive committees (City of Toronto, 1989a; Lenskyj, 2000). A consultant was also hired to design a public involvement process to address a wide range of issues (Olds, 1998). City Council would even approve the provision of $110,000 of “intervenor funding” which allowed community groups to apply for grants of up to $10,000 to examine and illustrate how the Games might impact local neighborhoods (City of Toronto, 1989a; Olds, 1998). This funding was to allow groups to research specific issues, prepare reports with recommendations, and conduct local meetings to make participation “more meaningful in the discussion and evaluation of the bid” (City of Toronto, 1989a). To qualify for funding groups needed to demonstrate expertise in one of the key aspects of the TOC, such as housing, tenant protection, environment issues, financial issues, labour issues, and race relations (OTF, 1990: Appendix D). Eighteen groups applied for funding, and eight were approved including the Metro Tenants’ Associations, Supportive Housing Coalition, Women Plan Toronto, Folk Arts Coalition, People United For Self Help, Citizens for Safe Environment, Toronto Waterfront Coalition, World Society for the Protection of Animals (OTF, 1990). In January 1990, each group submitted their reports to the Ontario Task Force with their results and recommendations.
Surprisingly, the BNC, an active lobbying group which led to City support for intervenor monies, was not funded as the City decided to only grant money to groups who were committed in improving the bid, not halting it (Olds, 1998). Some criticized this decision, stating that disadvantaged citizens with reservations about the viability of the project should not be excluded (City of Toronto, 1989b). Under these circumstances, the BNCC was still able to create their own anti-book, organize demonstrations against visiting IOC members, stage an “anti–Olympic” torch relay, and flood the media with flyers about Olympic embarrassments (Kidd, 1992). Despite the selective funding procedures, intervenor reports were not uniformly supportive of the bid. No intervenor report expressed its unqualified support as most expressed concerns about neglected issues and negative social impacts. Concerns revolved around affordable housing, homelessness, transportation issues, disability access issues, social needs and the environment (OTF, 1990; Lenskyj, 1996).

From November 1989 to January 1990, City Council would hold various public meetings around the city (City of Toronto, 1989b). Interested parties were invited to make deputations and share concerns and recommendations for action relating to the Olympic bid. Four meetings held in November dealt with housing/tenant protections, environment/waterfront, financial labour issues, and community participation. Five other meetings from December 1989 to January 1990 were held in different wards of the city “to make sure Torontonians can participate in the bid process” (City of Toronto, 1989b).

Initially, the TOOC indicated its support for the goal of public participation stating, “working together with all segments of our diverse society can only enhance the quality of life for all residents of this unique city” (TOOC, 1986). Nevertheless, despite this commitment, throughout the bid process many felt that Henderson and the TOOC took a relatively closed
doors approach when dealing with the public. Despite the commitments to public participation mandated in the Toronto Olympic Commitment, some citizens believed that the TOOC’s took on a tokenistic approach when holding the public meetings required by the TOC (Lenskyj, 2000). During the ongoing public meetings, TOOC were critiqued for using these sessions to promote their agenda, stacking speakers list during meetings, and by manipulating local media into promoting the bid (Lenskyj, 1996). Henderson was also quick to criticize any media source that brought “negative coverage” over the bid. The TOOC often asked for “fair” media coverage and would even ask corporate sponsors to pressure local media sources to promote positive images of the bid to Canadians (Byers, 1989; Nunes, 1990; Lenskyj, 1996). Some citizens critiqued these remarks questioning why the concerns of communities were viewed as a nuisance and discounted by the TOOC committee (OTF, 1990: Appendix 2). Other citizens criticized the inaccessible public meeting locations, limited advertising and notification, lack of consultation within the last three years, limited application time for intervenor funding (6 days) and research (2 months) (OTF, 1990: Appendix 2). Concerns over the bid cost, venue location, policy processes, development projects, cultural impacts, event accessibility, tenant protections, environmental sustainability, security, transportation and gender equality were brought up during these meetings (OTF, 1990: Appendix 2).

Groups like BNCC also critiqued the role of multinational corporations in the Olympic bid. Various members critiqued the numerous corporations that had a “free-ride” for making millions of dollars in profits “all at the expense of the public” (BNCC, 1990, p. 16). For the BNCC the Olympics are a “quick-profit scheme designed to help the multinationals” (BNCC, 1990, p.16).
This notion of elitist profit making can also be observed in an informal interview with Paul Henderson conducted by a college student (not released to the public until 1999). While talking about critiques of the TOOC’s Olympic financial statements, Henderson would mention “I know they are not right, because as soon as I tell them exactly how much money this thing is going to be, everyone wants a piece of it, and my job is to keep the money here”…“The problem is you can’t tell the truth” (Paul Henderson Interview, 1990). According to Henderson “the Olympics is a revenue generator” and “the truth of the Olympics is [that] it’s dumb to make a profit…if you make a profit everyone wants a piece of it” (Paul Henderson Interview, 1990).

After various council meetings, public-led social impact assessments, and a series of public meetings, on April 1990 Toronto City Council voted 12-4 in favor of approving the TOOC bid to the IOC (Kidd, 1992; Olds, 1998). The bid also received financial commitments from three levels of government and corporate sponsorships. In September 1990, the IOC selected the hosting city for the 1996 Games. Although Toronto Olympic boosters believed they had sent a strong bid, the IOC selected the city of Atlanta for the 1996 games.

Kidd argues that the dominant narrative of the 1996 Toronto Olympic bid became a story of divergent ambitions and political struggle, which in many ways discouraged the IOC from selecting the city (Kidd, 1992). Following the decision, the TOOC and Henderson stated that one of the major factors for the failed bid was the illusion of public antagonism from activist groups like the BNCC (Olds, 1998; Kidd, 1992). Henderson and bid boosters believed that Toronto’s desire for public participation cost them the 1996 Games (Kidd, 1992). Interestingly, in 1991 a subsequent analysis of the bid was conducted by the Ontario Ministry of Tourism and Recreation, which found dozens of weaknesses with Toronto’s bid process. The report found that the TOOC did not involve local communities in a meaningful dialogue and noted that it was
critical for communities to be engaged within the early stages of any bid process (OMTR, 1991; Olds, 1998).

When examining the 1996 Toronto Olympic Bid we can see how the TOOC and its leader Paul Henderson attempted to operate above place-based realities, which included an affordable housing crisis, rising reliance on food banks, and declining standards of living for the working classes (Oliver, 2017). According to Oliver (2017) Toronto’s bid team “went against the grain of a city that had earned a reputation for its commitment to an open decision-making process” (p.773). It can be argued that the tactics used by the TOOC involved a “political” or anti-democratic approach to mega-event planning processes. The ‘closed shop’ mentality and dismissal of local concerns created a contentious climate for the bid (Oliver, 2017). Scholars like Kidd (1992, p. 68) and Lenskyj (2000) have argued that the TOOC underestimated the risks of failing to meaningfully engage with citizens within the local public consultation process. While those opposed to the Olympics were disappointed that the bid was approved by Toronto’s City Council, the 1996 bid demonstrates the influence of local citizens exercising their right to be involved in the discussions of the bid process (Kidd 1992; Lenskyj 1992; Oliver 2011). Scholars have argued that hallmark events like the 1996 Olympics could not be successful without a full public discussion and an accountable process (Kidd, 1992, p. 76; Lenskyj, 2000).

3.3 2008 Olympics Bid

The 2008 Toronto Olympic Bid was launched by a loose coalition of public officials that included David Crombie (former Mayor), Mel Lastman (Mayor of North York), Joe Halstead (North York Parks and Recreation Commissioner), Barbara Hall (Mayor of Toronto), and William Bell (Mayor of Scarborough) (Oliver, 2011, p. 773). Like the 1996 bid, the allure of the
Olympics attracted a variety of interests with different socioeconomic, political, and urban desires. Learning from the failed 1996 Bid, the team lead by Crombie (originally called Toronto Olympic Bid Corporation, BIDCO) aimed to develop strong community support for the Olympic games which had been lacking in previous bids (Oliver, 2011). Initial efforts to acquire public consensus were not very structured and relied on word-of-mouth networking and informal discussions (Oliver, 2011, p. 775). From these discussions, guiding principles were determined by BIDCO which specified that the bid had to be: inclusive, socially responsible, environmentally progressive, financially sound, and must leave a legacy for sport and culture (Oliver, 2011).

Nevertheless, many individuals were skeptical of the bid, because despite these commitments, BIDCO, on May 1996, submitted a letter of intent to the COA for the 2008 Olympics, without ever holding a public debate if Toronto should advance a bid (Lenskyj, 2000; Oliver, 2011). Individuals like John Sewell (former Toronto councillor), critiqued the “low profile and secrecy” surrounding the initial bid process claiming that citizenry was being kept in the dark from crucial issues (Lenskyj, 2000; Oliver, 2011, p. 775). Reporters, like Vaughan (The Globe and Mail, 1996, p. A5), also shared their skepticism of the “group of self-appointed civic do-gooders” that were working on a mega-event bid without “city-wide consensus” (Oliver, 2011).

On February 24, 1998, BIDCO submitted a Draft Report to the Strategic Policies and Priorities Committee (SPPC) to consider the bid proposal (City of Toronto, 1998a). Like in the previous bid, coalitions of the Olympic event believed that Toronto had sufficient venues and facilities, communication infrastructure, accommodations for visitors, and transportation services to host the event (City of Toronto, 1998a). BIDCO claimed that the event could bring a boost to the local economy, create new employment, upgrade existing community recreation facilities,
and bring a cultural and civic event for the city (City of Toronto, 1998a). One of the main interests that predominated initial bid discussions involved the revitalization of Toronto’s waterfront into a meaningful urban space for the city (Oliver, 2011). Many bid proponents, like Crombie, perceived the “Olympic bid as a catalyst to bring together the power and the forces of levels of government and others to resolve the waterfront” (Oliver, 2011, p. 775). Preliminary staging proposals resembled technical plans from the 1996 bid, as most of the venues and facilities were located at Exhibition Place and other spaces along the central waterfront area (City of Toronto, 1998a). Olympic legacies promoted by BIDCO involved a series of new proposals for waterfront development like: new waterfront housing, transportation gateways, sporting venues, waterfront greening, parkland, and more (City of Toronto, 1998b). This vision was also supported by the COA’s Site Review Committee (SRC) which recommended a waterfront concept due to the IOC’s previous appeal to the site (City of Toronto, 1998a).

On March 4, 1998, Toronto’s City Council endorsed the bid, accepting BIDCO’s general vision of a waterfront-centered Olympic Games. In a report to council, the SPPC noted that although hosting the event entailed enormous responsibility “the potential opportunities and benefits derived from staging the Games [were] unparalleled” (City of Toronto, 1998a). The SPPC also stated that although Olympic-related developments were not dependent on the mega-event, “the Games could provide the catalyst for new partnerships to accelerate their implementation” (City of Toronto, 1998a). Toronto’s bid for a waterfront Olympics would accelerate urban revitalization on what “city bureaucrats have referred to as the last frontier of City building” (Kipfer & Keil, 2002, p. 246).

Although BIDCO had involved several hundred people throughout the production of the draft “bid book” and secured the initial consent of local councillors, some citizens expressed
their concerns over the bid and its leading organization. Citizen groups, like Bread Not Circuses Coalition, and the Metro Network for Social Justice committee, questioned the draft bid book and demanded more information on the details of the bid (Kipfer, 1998). Even though there was an “all-inclusive tone to the proposal” individuals like DiManno (1998, p. B01) questioned the true intentions of the bid and “who [was] actually behind it.” (Oliver, 2011).

An important piece of context to the 2008 bid is that in 1998, six former municipalities of Metro Toronto (Toronto, York, East York, North York, Scarborough, and Etobicoke) were forced to amalgamate into a single ‘Mega City’ of Toronto (Joy and Vogel, 2015; Oliver, 2017). Scholars like Isin (1998) argue that Metro Toronto’s amalgamation must be understood “in the context of broader formations of liberal regimes of government and the success of advanced liberalism” (p. 169). The province led initiative “was a response to many political and ideological issues, including a desire to suburbanize Toronto politics, reduce the scope of government in social service provision, and to make the city government more responsive to business influence” (Joy and Vogel, 2015, p. 40). Scholars like Keil and Boudreau (2005) have argued that Toronto’s amalgamation eroded the “liberal-progressive political regime that had existed in the downtown core” and as a result opening a political space for new forces to assert the combined logic of both “rollout and rollback neoliberalism” (p. 40). Based on definitions from Peck and Tickell (2002) “roll-back neoliberalism” involves the dismantling and deregulation of post-WWII Fordist-Keynesian structures, and “roll-out neoliberalism” involves the active creation of new institutions and regulations of the state and society (Kiel, 2002, p. 580). As a form of governmentality, Keil argues that neoliberalism “operates to regularize urban everyday life in ways that represent and reproduce the specific form of globalized, unrestrained capitalism” (Keil, 2002, p. 584). From the 1990’s to 2000’s Toronto continued to transform
under neoliberal urban entrepreneurial forms of governance. Since 1995, the Ontario provincial government drastically cut welfare provisions (starting with a 21% cut), enacted the “Safe Street Act”, reduced and redesigned local government (Boudreau 2000), cut thousands of full-time social service positions (Mallan 2001), eliminated all public housing programs and downloaded responsibilities to the local level (Urquhart 2001), deregulated the province’s environmental regime (Winfield and Jenish 1998), “enacted strategic attacks on public-worker unions”, underfunded the education system, limited school boards, and monitored and harassed civil society organizations (Keil, 2002, p. 589).

In an urban context, this trend loosened planning restrictions and allowed the “re-embourgoisement” of cities, involving the transformation of inner-city spaces for global elite culture and spectacle (Keil, 2002, p. 592). “Removing obstacles” to reinvestment, “liberating land-use,” and discarding “unattractive,” “outdated,” or “derelict” land uses, “through discretionary zoning, tax incentives, and centralized infrastructure investments” were viewed as best practices to emulate neoliberal revitalization strategies (City of Toronto, 2000d, p. 27, 32; Kipfer & Keil, 2002, p. 246). Furthermore, neoliberal restructuring can be observed through the rewriting of the city’s Official Plan which “combines the definition of livable urbanity with the explicit goals of the competitive city” (Keil, 2002, p. 595). According to Kipfer & Keil (2002), the vision of the Official Plan derives from a selective stakeholder closed-door vision-creation exercise “organized by a Toronto-based planning consulting firm that [had] extensive expertise in engineering entrepreneurial renewal processes” (p. 247). For scholars like Kipfer & Keil (2002), the Olympic Bid was one of the various urban strategies for Toronto to consolidate itself into a ‘competitive city’ (p. 227).
In April 1998, BIDCO presented the Toronto’s 2008 Olympic draft bid book to the delegates of the Canadian Olympic Association. At the meeting, BIDCO claimed that 500 individuals had participated in the development of the bid book, and that 35 ethnic groups and numerous community organizations had been engaged (BIDCO, 1998). Crombie’s “philosophy of inclusion, consensus and city building” helped obtain the approval from the COA as it demonstrated that initial public support had been solicited and incorporated into the bid book (BIDCO, 1998, p. 55). However, the COA’s support for the bid was contingent on the COA’s demand that the bid team be reconstituted with new individuals, a new board of directors, and an executive committee selected with the COA’s input (COA & City of Toronto, 1998; Oliver, 2011). For the bid to go forward, the COA argued that a new team was required to usher the international lobbying phase of the process (Brunt, 1998; Oliver, 2011). After some debate, Crombie accepted his new role as the chair of the board of directors (Lorinc, 2001). As a consequence of this restructuring, the initial community-based nature of BIDCO was replaced by a more corporate-oriented TO-Bid, which the City of Toronto had no jurisdiction over as it was a distinct legal entity (Oliver, 2011, p. 776).

For the bid to move forward City Council still had to approve the bid-city agreement that had been signed with the COA. On June 30th, 1998, the public was given the opportunity to provide deputations on their concerns over the Olympic bid during a Strategic Policies and Priorities Committee meeting (City of Toronto, 1998b). Although only seven citizens provided deputations on the Olympic bid, relevant concerns were discussed throughout the meeting. Like in the 1996 bid, ‘Bread Not Circuses Coalition’ shared their concerns over the ongoing bid process. Representing the BNC, Michael Shapcott strongly recommended that the Committee ensure that the TO-bid was democratically, financially and socially accountable to the people of
Toronto (City of Toronto, 1998b). He would also recommend that the Committee delay the ratification of the Bid City Agreement until after the public consultation process in which the public had a better understanding of the financial implications of the bid (City of Toronto, 1998b).

Academic Dr. Helen Lenskyj addressed the committee by outlining issues with the Olympic process. Lenskyj shared her expertise on the corruption of Olympic processes arguing that “public involvement and debate, through both community consultation and a free press, are strictly controlled and, in many cases, actively suppressed by Olympic organizers” (Lenskyj 2008). In her book Inside the Olympic Industry: Power, Politics and Activism (2000), Lenskyj also shed light on the challenges experienced by individuals wanting to make deputations, and the disinterest of councillors during presentations made by public participants.

The bid was also critiqued by Charles Smedmor, a chartered accountant, who shared his concerns over the financial projections of the bid. Based on the bid committees 1998 budget figures, Smedmor predicted a $1 billion deficit if Toronto were to host the Games (City of Toronto, 1998a; Lenskyj, 2000). His reasons for this projected deficit included the committee’s exclusion of capital costs, exclusion of infrastructure costs, and inclusion of inflated corporate sponsorship and projected licensing revenues in the bid (Lenskyj, 2000). Smedmor’s analysis was later published in the Toronto Star in which he outlined his concerns about City Council signing a contract with the Canadian Olympic Association “before it understands the nature and extent of the commitment and the potential financial exposure for Toronto’s taxpayers” (Smedmor, The Toronto Star, 1998, June 29, p. 1). According Lorinc (2001), Mayor Lastman responded by stating "The Olympics are going to make a profit," … "You have no right to question it".
Stephan Kipfer, representing the Metro Network for Social Justice Steering Committee (MNSJ) also made a deputation through a written letter to the SPPC. Kipfer expressed his organization’s concerns over the scheduling of the public consultation process, which placed public involvement opportunities at a disadvantage within the ongoing decision-making processes. MNSJ recommended that the Committee defer the ratification of the agreement until public participation was complete and Provincial and Federal Governments' guarantees were secured (City of Toronto, 1998b). MNSJ also recommended changes to the new Toronto Bid organization to include a non-profit committee “organized along the lines of a public agency, board, or commission with the regular obligations in areas of public information and public participation” to combat the “democratic deficit” (Kipfer, 1998b). MNSJ’s letter also suggested adding a binding attachment to the Bid City Agreement stipulating mechanisms to prevent negative financial, social and environmental effects (City of Toronto, 1998b).

Despite requests from public deputations, the SPPC recommended that the Toronto City Council ratify the bid city agreement and its structure to ensure the COA's continuing endorsement for Toronto's bid (City of Toronto, 1998b). On July 9, 1998 Toronto Council approved the contract between the city and the COA, thus propelling the bid into its next phase. With an Olympic agreement in place, the next order of business was to choose a Board of Directors for the newly named TO-Bid. Crombie wanted it to reflect the city's diversity; the three governments; and, the COA all wanted their own loyalists in place, and corporate backers also had to be considered (Lorinc, 2001). The Board eventually grew to more than 100 members, and be commended by some citizens for its ethnic and gendered diversity (James, The Toronto Star, 10 July, 1998, F1; Lorinc, 2001).
Another important item within the meeting was to outline the public consultation process that would be put into effect once bid-city agreement was approved. According to Halstead, the overall goal of the public consultation process had three objectives:

1. Provide the public with an opportunity to express their views on what they want the Olympics to do for the citizens of Toronto and our city;
2. Provide the public with access to and opportunities to participate in the Olympic planning; and,
3. Provide the citizens of Toronto with a public consultation process that receives input, incorporates new ideas, responds to concerns, educates the public, and builds support for the bid. (City of Toronto, 1998b).

The consultation process was to inform the public on the bidding process and involve assistance in 6 key areas (Social Equity, Environment, Financial Impact [Costs and Benefits], Transportation, Venues, Cultural Programming) related to the development of the bid. The first phase of the consultation process, designed to get public input for the 2008 Olympic Bid, involved community council meetings, focus group meetings, and open houses. Consultation were to be promoted through a brochure that would be distributed to community groups, special interest’s groups, and TO-bid mailing list. The second phase of consultation would focus on the draft bid book preparation and include general information meetings, local constituency meetings, roundtable meetings, stakeholder meetings, issue-specific workshops, presentations to community and business organizations, focus groups, surveys, and questionnaires. In the third phase, the details of the bid would be finalized and the various objectives of the bid would be
prioritized (City of Toronto, 1998b). Through this consultation and communication strategy the bid committee would assure that constituents would have the adequate information and opportunity to participate in the process (Oliver, 2011).

Although public input was greatly emphasized throughout City Council meeting in which the decision would be made to proceed with the bid, it is interesting to note that council chose not to incorporate the results of the community consultation process into the final bid proposal to the I.O.C. (City of Toronto, 1998, July 9). According to Lenskyj, the 22-32 vote (to include the results) ensured an antidemocratic public consultation process making the “entire consultation process a meaningless and time-wasting exercise for all participants” (Lenskyj, 2000). Although the public would be allowed to share their beliefs and concerns, the bid committee was not required to incorporate or address the concerns that emerged during the consultation process. To Lenskyj this consultation strategy occupied the “low rungs on the citizen participation ladder” (Lenskyj, 2000).

Public consultation occurred in the months of September and October 1998 in public meetings at each of Toronto’s six Community Councils. For members of the BNCC the overall process was unproductive as facilitators refused to discuss whether participants wanted the Olympic Games, but instead only address the question of “what conditions are necessary for [citizens] to support the bid?” (Lenskyj, 2000). Journalists, like Michelle Landsberg, critiqued the bid team for demanding citizens to “ask no questions!” throughout the “secretive bid process” (1998, September 13, p. A2). According to Landsberg it would be crazy to get behind the bid “until we know much, much more about the costs and benefits” (1998, September 13, p. A2).
In the summer of 1998, Morley Kells, Member of Provincial Parliament, was appointed to the position of Olympics Commissioner. Kells appointment secured the involvement of the Province within the bid process and helped address fiscal issues the City of Toronto lacked in authority to resolve (Oliver, 2011). The Olympic Commissioner stated that his role was to ensure that the City did not mismanage the bid by acquiring costly capital projects not needed for the bid (Oliver, 2011). On November 3, 1998 Kells introduced Bill 77: An Act to endorse the proposed bid of the City of Toronto to host the XXIX Summer Olympic Games. The Bill recognized the importance of Ontario Legislatures participation to have a successful bid process. More importantly the bid ensured the Office of the Ontario Olympics Commissioner’s involvement in defining the assurances and agreements required to the IOC by TO-Bid.

In November 1998, the media was also consumed with the shocking news of Salt Lake City bid officials bribing IOC members to secure the 2002 Winter Games. In addition, many journalists discussed how organizers of Toronto's 1996 bid had reported demands for bribes by unnamed IOC members since 1991 (Lorinc, 2001). This scandal brought some challenges to the bid committee.

In March 1999 John Bitove Jr. was named the CEO for the TO-Bid. According to Bitove, the efforts of the TO-Bid were to not just host the Olympics, but to “rebuild the city” in the process (Van Alphen, 1999, May 13 p. C1-C5; Oliver, 2011). In the fall of 1999, the TO-Bid released its Master Plan for the 2008 Olympic Games. The physical plan for the Games was altered from a CNE-centered proposal to a three-ring activity plan along the waterfront; Olympic Ring West at Exhibition and Ontario Place, Olympic Ring Central at SkyDome and Air Canada Center, and Olympic Ring East at the Port Lands.
One factor that allowed the revise plan to move forward involved the Chretien (federal) government’s appointment of a reliable slate of directors for the port authority (i.e. Jim Ginou and Robert Wright) (Lornic, 2001). According to Lorinc, “the port authority, which has a history of blocking non-industrial uses of the port lands, would not be an obstacle in the Olympic planning process”. Furthermore, TO-Bids Master Plan also got a boost from city planning’s “Unlocking Toronto’s Port Lands: Directions for the Future” (TUPDS, 1999). The report advocated for a new direction and vision to revitalize the Port Land’s and expand the industrial lands into a mixed-use space. The release of, Our Toronto Waterfront!—The Wave of the Future also promoted this vision of a revitalized waterfront (City of Toronto, 1999). The report claimed that the new Toronto waterfront would be “a place to play, work and live” for all citizens to enjoy (City of Toronto, 1999). The report even mentioned that the waterfront vision was “big enough to embrace the 2008 Summer Olympics” but that the city intended to “realize this vision with or without the Olympics” (City of Toronto, 1999). The new port authority and zoning visions greatly helped the Olympic process in moving forward. Nevertheless, many criticized the Master Plan and waterfront vision due its omission of implementation strategies and funding models.

Morley Kells, the provincial government’s Olympic Commissioner, objected to the spatial claims that TO-Bid had made with its Master Plan. Kells (2004) was convinced that the Port lands were an unnecessary risk and a “financial sinkhole for provincial tax payers” (Oliver, 2011, p. 780). He argued, “it can become an irreversible drain on the public purse. None of the details has ever been debated in the House of Commons, the Ontario Legislature or City Hall, although the Toronto Council approved it in principle” (Kells, 2000, p. A17; Oliver 2013).
Without a proper democratic debate, Kells believed that the “waterfront plan and the Olympic blueprint were still operating in a democratic deficit” (Oliver, 2011, p. 780).

On November 3, 1999 Toronto’s Mayor Mel Lastman, Mike Harris, Ontario Provincial Premier and Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced a proposed task force to develop an action plan for the waterfront vision. According to Lorinc, the appointed members also had to ensure that the “ultimate recommendations” made by task force “fit with Bitove's Olympic plan” (Lorinc, 2001). The Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force was chaired by Toronto financier Robert Fung and was composed “almost exclusively of private-sector business people, many of whom were directly connected to the Olympic bid” (Laidley, 2006, p. 268). In early 2000, the Task Force produced its report, which outlined a three-part ‘strategic business plan’ for waterfront development (TWRTF, 2000; Laidley, 2006).

Between November 1999 to December 1999 the Olympic bid consultation process continued (City of Toronto, 1999). This process included a questionnaire distributed to approximately 3000 organizations and agencies in Toronto, a telephone survey to random Toronto Region households, 28 ward Town Hall meetings, 22 focus groups, and a feedback website. Although preliminary findings were presented to Toronto council in February 2000, the complete report from the Community Social Planning Council was due at the end of March, well after the City of Toronto would decide if they approved the TO-Bid application to the IOC (City of Toronto, 1999). Upon its approval of the Master Plan by City Council in February, the Bid engaged in an Official Plan Amendment and Rezoning process and an Environmental Assessment process.

On February 11, 2000, a report from city staff was sent to City Council recommending that Toronto approve the application of the TO-Bid to be considered by the IOC as the host city
for the 2008 Olympic Games (City of Toronto, 2000). The report mentioned that the Olympic Games would provide tremendous economic, social and environmental benefits to the Province and Canada. The Olympic Games were said to bring 4000 mixed housing units, promote the cities diversity and international image, increase sport and cultural involvement, $8 billions of activity across the Province, 165,000 person years of employment, allow the retrofitting aging facilities, enhance the quality, uniqueness and significance of the waterfront and more (City of Toronto, 2000). It became evident that City staff viewed the Olympics as a city building strategy (City of Toronto, 2000).

On February 17, 2000, The Economic Development and Parks Committee would vote if the city were to approve the Bid application. This meeting, for various citizens, was the “last chance to influence the city’s 2008 Olympic bid” (Byers, 2000, February 16, p. A7). The meeting involved over eighty deputations by members of city staff, politicians, citizen groups and individual citizens. Although some representatives applauded TO-Bids efforts, many deputations would bring up questions over the transfer of public lands into private hands, social housing tenant protections, financial audits, and the desire for more consultation (City of Toronto, 2000a). Nevertheless, the Economic Development and Parks Committee voted 8-0 to support the bid. On February 29, 2000, Council confirmed its support for the bid with a vote of 54-2 to proceed.

On October 2000, Lastman, with Prime Minister Jean Chretien and Premier Mike Harris, announced a $1.5 billion joint investment to revitalize the waterfront. With this news, Lastman stated “now we can show the IOC that we have the funding in place to build the greatest waterfront in the world” (City of Toronto, 2000b). The Olympics not only transformed
government policy in favour of waterfront development, but it also forced governments into “financing environmental remediation and infrastructure provision” (Laidley, 2006, p. 267).

In the final months leading up to the IOC’s decision, many decisions were fast-tracked to satisfy the expectations of the international panel of judges (Oliver, 2011). Reporters, like Perkins (2001, January 13, p. C06), criticized Toronto City Council’s role in facilitating the progress of the “bid machine” without in depth analysis. To ensure that the Olympics did not expose Toronto’s taxpaying public, an agreement was made with the Ontario government to hold the Province “responsible for cost overruns” (Oliver, 2011, p. 781). This essentially would put the onus of the Olympics on the Provincial government (Oliver, 2011, p. 781). Council also voted to support the creation of the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, to have public-sector financing be taken off the books of the Olympic bid (Laidley, 2006, p. 269). The corporation was given significant powers including “its own legal persona, with an ability to acquire, hold and dispose of property, raise financing and be a party to transactions and legal proceedings in its own name. The corporation [was also granted] effective control of the development of all waterfront lands, implementing a previously agreed upon overall plan” (Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force, 2000, p. 61). Many were skeptical of this corporation as it reduced the public’s influence over the future of the waterfront (Oliver, 2011, p. 782). The proposal to centralize planning control over the portions of the Toronto waterfront in the hands of a development corporation represented a state-led strategy to privatize what was mostly publicly owned land (Kipfer & Keil, 2002, p. 248). As mentioned by a planning consultant, to realize the waterfront vision, a waterfront agency “won’t need to be transparent … it’ll need to be omnipotent” (Novae ResUrbis 2000, p. 3; Kipfer and Keil 2002, p. 248).
In February 2001, the BNCC also released their “Anti-Olympic Bid Book” which challenged the Olympic Bid and its hosting rationale. The BNCC critiqued why the TO-Bid’s bid books were delivered to the IOC without ever allowing the public to review the final proposals (Bread Not Circuses Coalition, 2001). TO-Bid representatives responded by arguing that the competitive nature of the bidding process required secrecy so that “other candidate cities would not benefit from having viewed Toronto’s plans” (Oliver, 2011, p. 782). On July 13, 2001, at the 112th session of the International Olympic Committee in Moscow, the 2008 Olympic Games were awarded to Beijing, China. Toronto would lose only capturing twenty one percent of the vote.

Through this case study it is clear that the 2008 Olympic bid also involved an anti-democratic approach throughout the planning process. Toronto’s 2008 bid could not be accused of neglecting to engage in public participatory processes (Oliver, 2017, p. 295). Under BIDCO and the TO-Bid the bid teams engaged in a series of broad-based informal and formal discussions, “centered on trying to define the bid’s principles, and worked to reach out to the diverse communities of the city” (Oliver 2011, 2014, 2017, p. 295). The problem, as Lenskyj (2000) points out, “is that although the public consultation process was extensive, the results of the consultation were never binding” (Oliver, 2017, p. 295). Although the public was invited to discuss their beliefs over the Olympics, some citizens believed these endeavors were tokenistic in nature, as their participation had no power over the outcome of the bid (Lenskyj, 2000). Furthermore, the replacement of Crombie’s community based bid team to a more corporate-oriented bid coalition also played a role in the depoliticization of ongoing mega-event processes. Although the 2008 bid effort was governed by a public-private partnership, the city had no jurisdiction over the operations of the TO-Bid, therefore allowing the private entity to make
important decisions without public debate (Oliver, 2017, p. 295). Despite claims of extensive community consultation Oliver (2017) argues that the “public-private governance model” privileged private actors like the TO-Bid and catered to the demands of non-state actors like the IOC & COA (p. 296). Oliver also argues that the bid reveals Toronto’s “adoption of neoliberal logic [within the last decades] that promoted economic competitiveness, but constrained participatory processes” (Oliver, 2017 p. 296).

3.4 World Expo 2025 Pre-Bid & Recent Event Activity

Although the city would lose the 1996 and 2008 Olympic bids, Toronto would continue to engage with discussions and ambitions to host a future hallmark event. In 2015, Toronto hosted the Pan-Am/ParaPan-Am Games, which is major international multi-sport event much smaller in scale compared to the Olympics. These games where held in venues across Toronto including seventeen other communities in the Golden Horseshoe (City of Toronto, 2009). The $2.5-billion Pan Am Games included promises of new athletic facilities, enhancements in the local economy, much-needed infrastructure upgrades and a regional boost for sports culture (City of Toronto, 2009; Stevenson, 2015). The provincial government took charge of the 2015 bid efforts in the hopes of creating “a powerful sports legacy” and urban regeneration (Oliver, 2017, p. 296).

Some residents critiqued the Pam-Am/ParaPan-Am Games for their high costs and large influx of people potentially disturbing local functions (Burnett, 2015). Despite these criticisms, the event managed to capture the imagination and enthusiasm of various citizens (personal interview, Scott Pennington, 2017). From an urban planning perspective, many citizens viewed the Pan-Am Games as a successful event as it accelerated certain projects and developments
within the city (Pennington, 2017; Mihevc, 2017). These “legacies” include certain athletic facilities like the Toronto Pan AM Sports Center, the Mattamy National Cycling Centre, the renovated York U Track, and housing developments like the Athletic village now known as the Canary District. Considering the billions that were spent on the games, fresh off these success stories, some politicians and citizens began to question if Toronto was now ready to host a larger event, like the Olympics or World’s Fair.

On September 15, 2015, the idea for a 2024 Olympic bid was quickly considered and then rejected by the Toronto Mayor, due to time restraints that did not allow the city to build consensus with communities before the one-month deadline to submit a formal bid (CBC News, 2015, September 15). Like with previous bids mega-event, advocates were hoping a winning bid could help Toronto access funding from higher levels of government to address significant infrastructure and social needs (personal interview, Councillor Wong-Tam, 2017). For example, for the 2015 Pan-Am/ParaPan-Am Games the Federal government committed funds of $500 million while the province committed $769 million, some of which went to infrastructure development (OAGO, 2016). However, Mayor Tory argued that that the Olympic games should not be viewed as a tool to solve ongoing city issues, instead he advocated to “invest in making sure [Toronto] works for everyone” (CBC News, 2015, September 15). Some politicians and citizens applauded the mayor’s decision not to bid as they believed priorities should be to solve existing city problems “not put on a spectacle for somebody else” (CBC News, 2015, September 15). However, Mayor Tory did not dismiss the idea of Toronto hosting an event in the future. Toward this end, the mayor created a panel to advise Toronto on bidding for future major events (CBC News, 2015, September 15).
Toronto, like other large cities, is facing urban challenges that include population growth, aging infrastructure, traffic congestion, lack of investment in social housing, poverty and the distribution of community services (City of Toronto, 2016b). In 2016, City staff reported that Toronto needed to find a way to fund $33 billion in approved capital projects in the city. Some of these projects include the Downtown Relief Line, $4.1 billion; Environmental Assessment Projects, $2 billion; Toronto Community Housing Corporation State of Good Repair Backlog, $1.72 billion; City Programs and Agencies State of Good Repair Backlog, $1.66 billion; TTC board-approved unfunded projects, $2.67 billion; Waterfront Transit, $1.05 billion; and more (City of Toronto, 2016a; City of Toronto, 2016b; Toronto Sun, 2016). The City also faces substantial capital needs for both new infrastructure and state of good repair (Rider, 2015, City of Toronto, 2016a).

The budget outlook for 2016 encountered many funding challenges forcing departments and agencies to find 2.6 per cent worth of reductions in the 2017 budget (Pagliaro, 2016, July 12). According to the City manager, tight financial challenges facing the City left council with insufficient revenues for upcoming years, i.e. a $516 million operating shortfall in 2017 (Pagliaro, 2016, July 12). Ongoing financial challenges have led to service cuts for transit users, Toronto Community Housing tenants and other vulnerable citizens (Pagliaro, 2016, July 12; Pagliaro, J & Mathieu, E., 2017). With these conditions the City of Toronto had its hands full in trying to run an effective and efficient government (Pagliaro, 2016, July 12; Powell, 2016, October 17).

Although an Olympic pre-bid was rejected, some councillors and citizens believed Toronto was ready to host a different type of international event: The World’s Expo (Wong-Tam, 2017; Miheve, 2017). World Fairs are global events that aim to educate the public, share
innovation, promote progress and foster cooperation (WECBC, 2016; Wong-Tam, 2017). Held
every five years, Expos provide an opportunity for the development of new ideas and
innovations that will address the challenges facing humanity (WECBC, 2016). According to the
World Expo Canada Bid Corporation (WECBC), unlike the Olympics or FIFA Games, the
World Expo is not just a consumer event but a forum that attracts nations, international
organizations, corporations, and the public to facilitate trade, innovation and commerce
(WECBC, 2016; Wong-Tam, 2017).

Prior to the 2015 Pan Am Games, Toronto City staff had already begun to explore the
feasibility of hosting World Expo 2025. On June 6, 2012 City Council directed the City Manager
and the General Manager, Economic Development and Culture to obtain information on the pros
and cons of bidding to host the World Expo (City of Toronto, 2012). Nevertheless, ambitions for
a World Expo would quickly be challenged in October 2012, as the federal government chose to
cancel its $25,000 per year membership with the Bureau International des Expositions (BIE), the
body in charge of World Expos (Rider, 2012, October 23). In a letter to Mayor Ford, Heritage
Minister James Moore expressed that “Canada will … not be supporting future Canadian Expo
bids” due to the federal government’s commitment in reducing Canada’s “deficit and returning
to balanced budgets” (Grant, 2012, October 23). Although attempts by the mayor and other
councillors to suspend the federal government’s decision failed, initial feasibility studies were
conducted and presented to City Council on February 19, 2014 (City of Toronto, 2014).

After the Pan-Am Games, discussions for a potential World Expo bid remerged amongst
politicians and Toronto citizens. Councillor Kristyn Wong-Tam truly believed in the benefits of a
World Expo, and lead the push for Toronto to host the event. Ryerson University president
Sheldon Levy and director and CEO of the Toronto Arts Council Claire Hopkinson, among
others, also played major roles alongside Wong-Tam. Various former and current councillors in 2015 joined the cause and stated their support, believing that the six-month long showcase of trade, innovation and products from around the world would bring a boost to the city (Smme & Shahzad, 2016).

Advocates of Expo 2025 viewed this event as an opportunity for Toronto to take the center stage and share what it meant to be Canadian to the world (Wong-Tam, 2017). They argued that the Expo provided an opportunity for the world to understand Canada’s progressive values, social inclusion, innovative technologies, and its commitment to environmental sustainability (Wong-Tam, 2017). The interactions and encounters were also seen as opportunities for enhancing Toronto’s global profile and image by placing the city at the center of a scientific, social, economic and cultural discourses of global relevance and importance (City of Toronto, 2014b; Wong-Tam, 2017).

Proponents also argued that the event could be an economic generator for the city by boosting tourism, creating thousands of temporary jobs, and attracting inward investment to the GTA (WECBC, 2016). Expo 2025 was viewed as a tremendous global marketing opportunity for Toronto, and to promote the city as an international destination (Wong-Tam, 2017). Booster of the 2025 Expo even argued that hosting the event would catalyze investment in infrastructure, and accelerate the development and renewal of urban areas such as the Port Lands (WECBC, 2016a; Wong-Tam, 2017). For Councillor Wong-Tam (personal interview, 2017), a large event like the World Expo was needed to tap into the Port Land’s and mobilize development at the site. “An Expo 2025 initiative can be the catalytic force that accelerates this under-utilized yet strategically located area for future parkland, public spaces, mixed-use communities, high order transit, employment zones and of significant importance new revenues” (Wong-Tam, 2017).
decades, the Portland’s has remained untouched due to contentious politics and diverse
ownerships of land (Pennington, 2017).

To gain support, a coalition called Expo Canada 2025, (a group of politicians, local
citizens, and civic and business leaders), facilitated discussion panels, public meetings in certain
neighbourhoods and conferences with different corporations, to spread the idea of a 2025 Expo
bid (Expo 2025 Canada, 2016). In January 2016, at the mayor’s invitation, two officials from the
Paris-based Bureau International des Expositions (BIE) visited Toronto to explore Toronto as a
potential host city for the 2025 World Expo. After meeting with the Mayor's Advisory
Committee and taking a tour of potential Expo 2025 sites Dr. Vicente Gonzalez Loscertales
stated that “Toronto had everything needed to host a World Expo” (WECBC, 2016b).

On May 19, Prime Minister Trudeau sent a letter indicating that the federal government
was willing to “explore the next steps” if council decided to submit a bid (Choise, 2016).
Proponents for the bid received these statements as great encouragement within the pre-bid
process (Expo 2025 Canada, 2016).

As this movement grew, the Mayoral Advisory Panel on International Hosting
Opportunities, completed a report in March 2016, called “Bringing the World to Toronto”
(Nixon et al, 2016). The report looked to determine future international hosting opportunities for
the City, how major international events can create broadly-shared benefits while responsibly
managing costs, and provided direction to how Toronto should go about pursuing future hosting
opportunities (Nixon et al, 2016). The Advisory Panel identified five core principles to inform
decisions on event bidding and hosting opportunities. The panel recommended these principles
as criteria when deciding if Toronto should pursue a bid.
5 Hosting & Bidding Principles

1. **Start from a position of strength**, emphasizing the need for shared commitment by all orders of government and the private sector prior to launching an event bid;

2. **Optimize Toronto as a host city and region**, underscoring the importance of ensuring a strong hosting capacity through a responsible financial plan, diverse leadership team, and meaningful engagement with communities and partners across the Greater Toronto Area;

3. **Advance key City-building priorities** by leveraging a mega event to advance areas such as transit, affordable housing, and other civic infrastructure;

4. **Responsibly manage hosting costs, resources and risks** by minimizing the City’s financial exposure, and mitigate risks related to bidding on and hosting a mega event; and

5. **Generate benefits and legacies for all Torontonians** to ensure that a mega event has a wide-ranging, positive impact for communities across the City. (City of Toronto, 2016, p. 6)

On May 24, 2016, recommendations on Toronto’s future with mega-events were discussed during an Executive Committee meeting at City Hall. At this meeting, the Executive Committee endorsed the five “Evaluation Principles” from the Mayor's Advisory Panel on International Hosting Opportunities; required that any Expo bid be contingent on agreement with the Federal and Provincial governments; and necessitated that any Expo funding be separate from any monies already allocated for to transit, housing and other infrastructure (City of Toronto, 2016d).

Another component of the motion passed by the committee involved a request for Council to accept the offer of a privately funded feasibility report to determine the incremental
cost and associated benefits with hosting Expo 2025 (City of Toronto, 2016d). During the meeting over 35 individuals from labour, arts, business and community sectors deputed their support for the bid. That same morning, in a press event, former Toronto Mayors Art Eggleton and Barbara Hall along with former Ontario Premier David Peterson urged councillors to bid on Expo, not only because of the economic stimulus, but because of the opportunity to showcase Toronto as a diverse, innovative and vibrant city (Expo 2025 Canada, 2016). Former Mayor David Crombie also sent a letter making a passionate case for Expo. Despite proclaimed support from current and former politicians, Toronto Mayor John Tory remained unconvinced the city would benefit from hosting World Expo 2025 (Smme, 2016). The mayor added that he would not want any funding already committed to transit, housing or other infrastructure to be reduced or impacted if the federal or provincial governments agreed to support the Expo (Smme, 2016).

On June 7, 2016, Toronto City Council voted to accept the offer of a privately funded feasibility report at no cost to taxpayers. This report would outline the incremental cost and associated benefits of hosting Expo 2025. A group of 40 prominent business people led by Ken Tanenbaum, immediately began the process of commissioning a cost-benefit study of Expo 2025 (WECBC, 2016).

The importance of a participatory process was discussed during various stages of the pre-bid processes for Expo 2025. The Mayor's Advisory Panel on International Hosting Opportunities strongly recommended that communities must be engaged from the earliest stages of the planning process. They also argued that ongoing, meaningful consultation helps to ensure that an event is relevant and impactful for communities across the City (Nixon et all, 2016). The Secretary General of the BIE also stated, “in our experience, the host city has to have very strong communication with its citizens” (Ridway, 2016). He explained “There’s no way to hide
preparation for an event of this scale. You are going to have some discomfort due to
coloration, so you have to communicate the event’s advantages” (Ridway, 2016). Staff Reports
also recommend that community consultation and broad public engagement be required, (if the
bid continued) to best leverage the potential legacies of Expo, identify and address any concerns
from residents, and ensure consistent communication between event organizers and impacted
communities (City of Toronto, 2016d)

During the creation of the feasibility study, WEBCO claimed to have implemented a
detailed consultation program to engage residents and community stakeholders. Sessions were
held with Port Lands Community Stakeholders and Tenants involving some 12 groups, including
the West Don Lands Committee (WEBCO, 2016a). An Expo 2025 visioning session was also
conducted involving representatives from nine organizations, in addition to four members of the
World Expo Canada 2025 Feasibility Study consulting team (WEBCO, 2016a). Members of the
Expo 2025 Canada Steering Committee and Feasibility Study claimed to also reach out to 1,097
individuals, organizations, companies and groups (WEBCO, 2016a). This outreach resulted in
566 meetings regarding Expo 2025. The consultation program also included social media and
digital engagement (www.expo2025canada.ca and #Expo2025) (WEBCO, 2016a).

A survey conducted by Hill+Knowlton Strategies found that 56 percent of Toronto
residents that participated in the survey supported the bid, while 27 per cent said they were not
sure and 15 per cent were opposed to the idea (Shum, 2016, October 21). A Forum Research poll
would reveal that out of 822 Torontonians 42 per cent support making a bid (Rider, 2016, June
22).

This feasibility report was released on October 13, 2016, and found that the Expo could
be hosted in Toronto, contingent on various requirements. The site deemed most viable for the
event was the Port Land’s site, due to its size, relative location to the downtown core, and its development plans that aligned with the Expo Master Plan (WEBCO, 2016a). Nevertheless, this feasibility was dependent on three conditional elements, the Lowe Don River Flood Protection, Unilever East Harbour RER station and rail link, and the establishment of Expo 2025 specific planning bodies (WEBCO, 2016a). The cost to host the event was estimated to be $1.91 Billion, nevertheless the Expo Master Plan would require the completion of planned infrastructure (unfunded City approved long-term capital projects) that were expected to take place regardless of the event (WEBCO, 2016a). According to the report, Expo 2025 would produce a $4.37 billion boost to the national GDP, deliver $1.26 billion in tax revenue and create more than 50,000 person years of employment and bring an expected 19 million visitors outside the GTA (WECBC, 2016a). Omitting the $1.06 Billion expense of unfunded city infrastructure projects, and assuming the event would bring $1.26 billion in direct tax revenue, the World Expo would cost a net investment of $650 million (WECBC, 2016a). At the end of the report, the feasibility study also examined the bid under the five strategic Hosting Principles Checklist from the Mayors Advisory Panel on International Hosting Opportunities. According to the WEBCO study, Expo 2025 portrayed a favorable case for a bid, meeting most of the principles with strong to medium ratings (WEBCO, 2016a).

However, on October 21, City staff provided their review and analysis of WECBC’s Expo Feasibility Study. The City also engaged HLT Advisory Services to complete a peer review of the Feasibility Study (City of Toronto, 2016c). The objective of the peer review was to assess the strengths and limitations of the WECBC’s Feasibility Study and its methodology, along with the rationale for the conclusions and recommendations presented (City of Toronto, 2016c, October 21).
This City report agreed that Expo 2025 has the potential to be the largest and most impactful economic and cultural event held in Canada. Nevertheless, City staff recommended that Council not support the development of a bid to host Expo 2025 in Toronto. While the Feasibility Study demonstrated the potential for considerable economic and other legacy benefits because of hosting Expo 2025, City staff found several significant challenges and risks related to staging the event which outweighed the advantages (City of Toronto, 2016c). These issues include the lack of provincial and federal support for hosting the event, absence of Canada's membership with the BIE, the need for significant capital funding estimated at $6 to $7 billion, and a challenging construction schedule that could lead to cost overruns (City of Toronto, 2016c). When conducting their own evaluation of the bid based on the five strategic hosting principles checklist, City staff and HLT Advisory Services found that the bid did not successfully meet all the criteria’ scoring medium to weak results (City of Toronto, 2016c). City staff recommended that Toronto Council not pursue a bid for the 2025 World Expo due to its significant financial, operational and reputational risks. It is also important to note that the Feasibility Study recommended a process for expedited provincial and municipal approvals. An expedited process involved federal approvals related to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and other applicable federal legislation (City of Toronto, 2016c). The study did not indicate whether any orders of government have been consulted on this recommendation (City Staff, 2016c). This notion brings up concepts of the World Expo working under a state of exception. This state of exception would involve by-passing normal planning legislation procedures, and ignoring timely and democratic public involvement processes.

On October 26, John Tory and his Executive Committee would decide if they supported the development of a bid to host Expo 2025 in Toronto. After nearly five hours of deputations
from local councillors, private consulters, local business leaders, construction companies, arts and community groups, and city residents, the Mayor and the committee voted to not support a bid for a Worlds Expo. Mayor Tory dismissed the assertive push made by dozens of deputations, arguing that the cash-strapped city should not partake in a bid that could potentially take away from funds that are needed for numerous repair projects in the city. At the Executive Meeting, he stated, “I am not going to take money out of what we need to fund transit and housing to support an Expo, or just about anything else for that matter” (Gray, The Globe and Mail, 2016, October 26). Although he did not support the bid for 2025, the Mayor moved a motion stating that the city should remain open to future Expo bids, including the 2030 Expo. “Not never. But not right now” (Gray, The Globe and Mail, 2016, October 26).

On November 9th City council voted 29-10 to not support the development of a bid to host Expo 2025. Interestingly a vote for Toronto remain open for future Expo bids, including Expo 2030 was received differently passing with a 33-5 vote.

Within the World Expo pre-bid case study, there were initial democratic attempts in facilitating public involvement and engagement throughout the event planning process. Pre-bid organizers were content with the engagement that was done with various communities which provided individuals the chance to depute their beliefs within City and community led meetings.

Nevertheless, if City Council were to advance the 2025 Expo bid, what type of approach would be implemented throughout the event-planning process. Based on current governance models and recent mega-event trends in Toronto, it could be argued that the 2025 World Expo bid would be enticed to enact “anti-democratic” approaches within its planning processes. In his article, Sport mega event planning in Toronto: From a democratic demand to a democratic demise, Oliver (2017, p. 292) traces the shift in governing models from Toronto’s failed bid in
1996 to recent hosting of the 2015 Pan Am Games. He argues that there has been an alarming erosion of the role of the public in the mega event bidding process due to new governance models based on urban entrepreneurialism and consensus politics (Oliver, 2017). To be more effective, recent international events like the 2015 Pan Am Games have been implemented through provincial led processes “that removed local politics from the bidding process” (Bellas & Oliver, 2016; Oliver, 2017). According to Bellas and Oliver (2016), the 2015 Pan American Games illustrates how Toronto was able to host a sporting mega-event without significant community outreach or public engagement. The public management of the bid by the province claimed to work for democratic interests “yet offered little opportunity for Toronto and its citizenry to shape the vision” (Oliver, 2017, p. 297). “In the case of the Pan American Games, the provincially led bid team focused on facility and games management questions and treated the local citizenry as consumers of their vision” (Oliver, 2017, p. 297). Considering the strategic methods used in recent events like the Pan Am games and ongoing neoliberal governance processes could the World Expo function under a democratic approach if the bid was approved by levels of government?

3.5 Case Studies Overview

These case studies outline mega-events in the context of Toronto within the last three decades. Through their histories, we can examine the dominance of anti-democratic approaches throughout various mega-event planning processes. This can be seen through the omission of public involvement opportunities, tokenistic participation tactics, or the complete omission of community involvement. Nevertheless, these case studies also shed light on some factors that challenge democratic planning within urban processes. One challenge derives from neoliberal
urban entrepreneurial forms of urban governance that emphasize market-oriented growth as a main strategic driver for urban development and growth. At times these hegemonic goals can cast a shadow over other quality-of-life needs (Kipfer & Keil, 2002).

These case studies also shed light on recent strategies that have been incorporated by mega-event coalitions in the hopes of obtaining consensus from urban communities. In the article, “Old Mega-Projects Newly Packaged? Waterfront Redevelopment in Toronto”, scholars like Lehrer and Laidley (2008) elaborate that unlike old mega-projects “where the public benefit was celebrated as an expression of democratic objectives”, mega-projects have “moved toward a much more competitive environment where public benefits are provided in order to attract those who are most desired” (p. 799). Mega-projects of today no longer involve “a single-focus project, but instead [are] made up of a ‘variety of little bits’” seemingly providing something for everyone (Lehrer and Laidley, 2008, p. 800). These perceived benefits come in the form of housing, retail and office space, natural amenities, community and cultural facilities, regional economic activity, etc. These strategies allow mega-event projects to be embraced despite the inequalities these processes create (Lehrer and Laidley, 2008, pg. 800). Lehrer and Laidley (2008) have also point out that public participation for today’s mega-projects do not begin at the “outset of all potential development options, but in the midst of them, foreclosing upon other possibilities from the beginning” (p. 800). They argue that “there is little or no consideration of options that do not follow the rules of capitalism guided by profit maximization through exchange value. Hence, social practices that are outside the capitalist mode of production are discouraged” (Lehrer and Laidley, 2008, pg. 800).

In the next chapter, I hope to argue over the importance of democratic public involvement within mega-event planning processes. I will argue that democratic approaches,
which truly involve communities and individuals within the planning process, are an essential component for any successful hosting event. As argued by Swyngedouw “proper urban politics fosters dissent, creates disagreement and triggers the debating of and experimentation with [for example] more egalitarian and inclusive urban futures, a process that is wrought with all kinds of tensions and contradictions but also opens up spaces of possibilities” (Swyngedouw, 2010, p. 2–3; Macleod, 2011). Nevertheless, as explored in these case studies it is important to consider existing urban governance models that create challenges when trying to enact democratic participatory processes. Enhancing public participation is just one component from various factors involved in mega-event planning processes.

4. Participatory Planning within Mega-Events

4.1 Public Participation in Planning

Public participation is “a process by which people are enabled to become actively involved in defining issues that concern them, in formulating and implementing policies, planning, and developing and delivering strategies to achieve change” (Litchfield, 1996; Marzuki, 2015, p. 23). Scholars like Deutsch (1985), have argued that decision-making processes are just as important as the decisions themselves (Jackson, 2001). Benefits of broad based community involvement in planning has been widely documented, which includes “enhancing the capacity of citizens to cultivate a stronger sense of commitment, increasing user satisfaction, creating realistic expectations of outcomes, and building trust” (e.g. Altschuler, 1970; Sanoff, 1978; Smith, 1993; McClure, 1997; Towers, 1995; Al-Kodmany, K., 1999, p. 37). Enabling people to participate in the decision-making processes allows the formation of collaborative solutions which help to create productions of space that reflect the needs of communities
(Deutsch, 1985; Jackson, 2001). Effective forms of public involvement also allow residents to take control of their destiny and of their local communities (Sanoff, 2000).

I will argue, in this chapter, that public involvement and community engagement are critical for the successful planning of any mega-event in the city of Toronto. I do this by initially analysing Toronto’s existing planning procedures and argue that mega-event processes should enforce current planning legislation and values that advocate for the inclusion of public involvement within the decision-making processes. I then elaborate on how public involvement can be used for the development of “hosting visions” which are representative of existing city goals and the public interest. I hope to shed light on why mega-event planning needs to be a collaborative process that involves the engagement of different individuals. I demonstrate why public participation must play a role in these processes. I conclude by analysing some principles that can be used for successful public engagement.

4.2 Public Participation in Toronto

Like with any planning process in the city of Toronto, public involvement is an essential and mandatory requirement for any development project. The importance of public participation is a central component to Ontario’s planning legislation. For example, the Planning Act (1990) encourages public involvement in the planning process. The Act requires the City to hold public meetings when considering amendment applications for Official Plans, Zoning Bylaws and Plans of Subdivision (Planning Act, 1990). This legislation ensures that the public is to be given notice and information over planning matters and processes. Depending on the process under the Act, any person or public body can make written or oral submissions regarding proposed plans, amendments, and reviews (Planning Act, 1990). Participation regulations under the Planning Act
prescribe minimum complete application requirements, but enables municipality to identify additional requirements (1990).

Some examples can be found in these sections of the Planning Act (1990)

- S.17. (15)
- S.17. (19.2)
- S 34. (12)
- S 51. (20)

Involvement is also promoted in Section 5.5 of the Official Plan. Toronto’s Official Plan sets out the policies that govern the formal process through which residents can participate in local land use decisions (City of Toronto, 2010). The Official Plan encourages participation by all segments of the population, which consist of an ethno-racial diverse set of individuals of all ages and abilities. The Plan also advocates for the promotion of community awareness of planning issues and decisions with documentation which is clear and understandable (City of Toronto, 2010). The public is to be provided with various opportunities to be informed and given the opportunity to contribute in planning processes. This involves encouraging pre-application community consultation, participating in community meetings, and ensuring that information and materials are accessible in advance (City of Toronto, 2010).

Within the commitments of planning institutions like the Canadian Institute of Planners (CIP) and the Ontario Professional Planners Institute (OPPI), we can also find this mandate to foster public participation. The CIP ‘Statement of Values’ advocates for “meaningful public participation by all individuals and groups and seek to articulate the needs of those whose interests have not been represented” (CIP, 2017). Furthermore, the OPPI Professional Code of Practice also advocates for providing “opportunities for meaningful participation and education in the planning process to all interested parties” (OPPI, 2017). Planners are to be advocates of the
public interest and practice “in a manner that respects the diversity, needs, values and aspirations of the public and encourages discussion on these matters” (OPPI, 2017).

According to the City of Toronto public participation in decision-making is a cornerstone of good governance (City of Toronto, 2014b). The City of Toronto is committed to ensuring residents have a strong voice “in shaping the decisions of their government decisions which have a direct impact on their quality of life and the City's economic, social and environmental health” (City of Toronto, 2014b). According to the City, engagement helps to build capacity, inform planning processes, and facilitate city building (City of Toronto, 2014b). Engagement in Toronto is to ensure that residents and stakeholders are informed of ongoing planning processes, are equipped to meaningfully participate in the planning process, while allowing the city to grow as a place to live, work and play (City of Toronto, 2017).

Based on this overview of Toronto’s commitment to public participation within planning processes, it is clear that mega-event planning processes should be held accountable to the engagement standards of the City. Muller (2014) has argued that regular planning procedures should remain in force in the planning for mega-events as these procedures “exist to ensure equal consideration of interests and rational decision making” (p. 14). Overruling regular procedures increases the risk of non-transparent results that favor some stakeholders over others (Muller, 2014, p. 14)

For any hallmark event to be successful in Toronto there needs to be democratic public engagement throughout ongoing mega-event processes. Furthermore, since urban planning, in principle, should represent and protect the public interest, the public must be allowed to verify whether this is the case at all times (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003, p. 111).
4.3 The Public Interest

Within the planning practice there are various opinions of how to determine the public interest. The public interest implies ‘having something at stake’ (Pitkin, 1967) and is associated with welfare, gain or advantage across the general public (Campbell and Marshal, 2002, p. 166). For planners and the planning profession, working in the “public interest” has been a relevant “legitimating principle” for the practice (Alexander, 2002, p. 226). In its most limited sense, the ‘public interest’ in planning has been used as a standard to assess the validity of ongoing planning actions (Flathman, 1966; Campbell and Marshal, 2002, p. 166). According to scholars, “the public interest” in planning historically derives from a frame of reference in liberal political theory where disinterested well-educated experts, “working within the institutions of the modern state”, could objectively and rationally analyse problems and arrive at solutions that were in the public interest (Friedmann, 1987, pp. 6–7; Sandercock, 1998, p. 197). Nevertheless, critiques based on issues of “class, gender, and race have judged this particular view of planning and the public interest to be deeply flawed” (Sandercock, 1998, p. 196–198; 2002). Notions of universality and the supremacy of scientific reasoning have been scrutinized due to their “totalizing, homogenizing and elitist qualities” (Campbell and Marshal, 2002, p. 172). By the 1960s, the trust in technocratic conceptions of planning as a consensus-based idea of the public interest were increasingly challenged (Campbell and Marshal, 2002, p. 170). Furthermore, plurality and the splintering of special interest groups, competing for attention and resources “implied the need for new strategies” and understandings of the professions responsibility (Campbell and Marshal, 2002, p. 170).

Urban planning’s understandings of how to determine and operate under the public interest evolved throughout the end of the 20th century (Alexander, 2002). Scholars have
discussed different conceptions of the public interest (i.e. utilitarianism, unitary, deontological) (Howe, 1992, Alexander, 2002). For this paper, I will focus on what scholar’s term ‘dialogical approaches’ when determining the public interest. This approach focuses on “deliberation as a means of arriving at consensus and agreement” over conceptions of the public interest (Campbell and Marshal, 2002, p. 179). This is commonly associated with participatory forms of democracy which seek to avoid clashes of self-interest through the development of “open dialogue encouraging the emergence of shared solutions through the uncovering of new forms of knowledge and understanding” (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Campbell and Marshal, 2002, p. 179). Understandings of communicative rationality have been based on Habermas’s theory of communicative action, which has an emphasis on “inter-subjective communication as a fundamental prerequisite for understanding and transforming society” (Huxley, 2000, p. 369; Campbell and Marshal, 2002). According to Habermas, communicative action involves the interaction of at least two subjects, capable of speech and action, aiming to reach an understanding about a situation and their plans of action “in order to coordinate their plans by way of agreement or consensus” (Twedwr-Jones & Allmendinger 1998, p. 1975).

This approach has influenced various dialogic planning philosophies like 'communicative planning' (Forester, 1989), 'argumentative planning' (Forester, 1993), 'planning through debate' (Healey, 1992), 'inclusionary discourse' (Healey, 1994), and 'collaborative planning' (Healey, 1997) (Twedwr-Jones & Allmendinger 1998, p. 1976). Through these approaches the public interest can be determined and enacted through communicative processes.

Communicative/collaborative approaches must be receptive of difference, genuinely participatory, and strive to create calculated contexts that minimize inequalities of power and knowledge (Huxley, 2000, p. 369). Under this approach, the planning practice should act as a
forum for “discursive democracy” (Dryzek, 1994). Dialogue and collaboration are essential for understanding lived experiences and solving problems through consensus decision-making.

4.4 Advancing City Goals Through Mega-Events

One component that needs to be emphasized for future mega-event planning is the public's role in identifying and creating “hosting concept/vision” that works towards the advancement of varying city priorities across a wide range of local communities. In the Bringing the World to Toronto report (2016), the Mayor Advisory Panel determined five ‘Hosting Principles’ when evaluating and planning for future events. These principles include government support, ensuring the management of costs and risk, understanding bid process requirements and more (Nixon et all, 2016). A central argument from these ‘Hosting Principles’ was that mega-event processes needed to align with existing city objectives and deliver a broad range of benefits for communities across Toronto. According to Toronto Councillor Joe Mihevc’s understanding of the report (personal interview 2017, April 7), before hosting an event, it is important for a city to evaluate its long-term strategic goals, and if it is determined that hosting an event can “help achieve those goals, then there are good reasons to [host an event]” (Mihevc, 2017). Toronto Planner Scott Pennington (and report staff team member), also asserts the importance of determining if hallmark events can provide “leverage” to meet “existing objectives that don’t undermine or compromise existing [strategic goals or processes] in the city” (personal interview, 2017, April 10). On one side, this involves assuring mega-event processes advance needed capital projects involving transportation, housing, community development, and civil infrastructure and facilities (Nixon et all, 2016). These objectives also include economic, social, recreational, environmental and cultural legacies for local communities. For social justice
advocates, like Dr. Lenskyj, the true needs of the city (Bread, i.e. housing, poverty reduction, food etc.) will always be more important than hosting a mega-event (Circuses i.e. Megaprojects, selling the city) (Lenskyj, 2008; 2007). However, some councillors, planners, and some citizens (based on interviews with Wong-tam & Pennington) are more open to the idea of hosting a hallmark event, on the conditions that the event can guarantee the advancement of city initiatives and goals. For mega-event processes to be successful it is important for cities to not just “imply the potential benefits of an event, in terms of reputation or city building”, but to ensure mega-event investments can provide “calculated” and measurable long term benefits for city communities (Pennington, 2017). If mega-event processes don’t help advance “existing long-term strategic objectives in economic development, social equity, etc.” then it is not beneficial for the city to pursue mega international events (Mihevc, 2017). It is important to not “get caught on the hype, look to the long-term and make sure that the application fits your long-term goals as a city not your short-term goals to host a party” (Mihevc, 2017).

4.5 Identifying Toronto’s Strategic Goals

Therefore, it is critical to identify Toronto’s strategic goals, how are they determined, and who is involved. For future mega-event processes, we must ask how can we determine if an event helps to advance city goals and long-term strategic plans? I argue that one important element involves the use of democratic participatory decision-making and involvement. Democratic participatory processes are needed for collaborative, transparent, and accountable decision-making processes that serve the public interest.

According to the ‘Bringing the World to Toronto’ report, although governments and business communities would be the primary funders of international events, “the support and
engagement of local neighbourhoods and community stakeholders is the most important consideration for determining the value and ... the viability of a bid for a major event” (Nixon et all, 2016). Mega-event organizers must have a plan to meaningfully involve Torontonians and other impacted constituencies in determining whether hosting opportunities provides sufficient benefits for various communities (Nixon et all, 2016). “Each event involves a different community of interest, [and] no event can happen if you don’t get those community interests involved” (Mihevc, 2017). As mentioned by Pennington (2017), mega-events involve “a very substantial commitment of public resources, therefore there must be a debate around how you make use of those resources, that must be a part of the discussion whether this is the best use of scarce public monies.” Discussions about the strategic goals of the city before engaging in any mega-event hosting processes can help develop and identify Toronto’s needs as an urban region. As argued by various scholars, mega-event development can easily be appropriated by hegemonic neoliberal urban entrepreneurial urban policies that promote city competitiveness and market oriented pro-growth coalitions (Hall, 2006; Gold & Gold, 2008; Oliver, 2017). Without discussions that determine if a hallmark event is in the best interest of the city or a process that creates a hosting vision based on the public interest, mega-event processes can be used as strategies to further existing urban neoliberal strategic goals within an urban region (Muller, 2014). With Toronto’s transition to neoliberal, urban-entrepreneurial strategies, post-political characteristics have become major components of urban governance. The post-political city reflects “a governance regime concerned with policing, controlling and accentuating the imperatives of a globally connected neoliberal market economy for which there is ostensibly no alternative, while intensifying bio-political control and surveillance” (Swyngedouw, 2011, p. 3). Under this framework, neoliberal urban ideals become unquestioned in the post-political
formation which constitute an orthodoxy that ‘forecloses the political’ (Swyngedouw, 2009, p. 609; Paddison; 2009). Essentially, post-political debates revolve around how to enforce hegemonic agendas rather than whether “those concerns should be on the agenda in the first place” (Paddison, 2009, p. 15). According to Davidson & Iveson (2015, p. 546), ongoing strategies to become a competitive or world-class has resulted in urban policy agendas moving “beyond the realm of contentious democratic politics” in which urban politics are reduced to working towards hegemonic “necessities” (Davidson & Iverson, 2015, p. 546; Oliver, 2017).

Within the three Toronto case studies explored in Chapter three, I demonstrated how ideas of urban entrepreneurialism and city competitiveness have become a dominant influence on Toronto’s urban processes. Urban development through mega-event processes were often perceived by neoliberal coalitions as opportunities to facilitate “urban regeneration and recognition” (Gold & Gold, 2008; Oliver, 2017, p. 296). This emphasis on urban entrepreneurial, pro-growth, urban competitiveness creates challenges for urban democratic debates as neoliberal policies become hegemonic ideals overshadowing dissimilar public debates (Donald, 2002; Kipfer & Keil, 2002; Oliver, 2017). Mega-events have been largely managed by undemocratic coalitions which operate in disordered decision-making processes with the interests of facilitating “global flows rather than local communities” (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006, p. 18).

Although fostering “a strong and competitive economy” is part of the strategic vision for the city according to the Official Plan (2010), as explored in Chapter two various scholars have debunked the “mega-event strategy” as the best way to achieve city objectives (Burbank et al. 2001; Baade & Matheson, 2004; Hall, 2006; Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012; Muller, 2014). Therefore, it is important for cities to engage in public discussions over existing city goals and
determine if a mega-event can advance city objectives. Without deliberation in dwindling urban planning democracies, various public interests can be and have been ignored (Oliver, 2017).

### 4.6 Different Types of Consultation

Due to various challenges that stand in the way of democratic participation in the planning for hosting a mega-event, I hope to now shed light on some strategies that can help facilitate better public involvement. As argued by Jackson (2001) many stakeholders today are looking for full involvement, and not simple consultation as a political exercise. Taking these proposed steps will not automatically ensure success but can help to minimize failure throughout the process (Sanoff, 2000). Public involvement is just one component for fostering ethical decision-making processes, other factors (i.e. socio political structures, forms of urban governance, global economic structures) must also be considered.

### 4.7 Principles for Successful Public Involvement

1. *Identify Goals and Purpose of Consultation*

Before engaging in any forms of public participation, it is important to identify the purpose and goals of an ongoing engagement processes. It is important to be clear over why consultation is being sought, what is the desired outcome, and the purpose of the process (Cummings, 2014). Participation can be perceived differently depending on the issue at stake, people involved, and political setting in which it takes place. A good understanding of what is to be achieved is essential for developing an effective program to meet relevant goals (Cummings, 2014). For example, is the participation for gathering ideas, understanding attitudes, distributing ideas,
resolving conflict, reviewing a proposal comprehending consensus, reviewing opinions, etc. (Sanoff, 2000; Jackson, 2001; Cummings, 2014)

2. Identify the Audience’s Knowledge Over Issue

Understanding the public's knowledge of an ongoing issue can greatly enhance the public involvement processes. It is important to determine the most appropriate form of engagement which best suits existing public understanding. For those who are uninformed of an issue or do not understand the technicalities of a process, informing techniques can be entirely appropriate (Jackson, 2001). For community groups that are aware of the issues and processes, higher forms of dialogue and collaboration are needed to obtain impute, feedback, the sharing of ideas, and decision-making (Jackson, 2001). Participation can be interpreted differently by different groups of individuals. Preferred methods for participation also depend on the situations or processes on the table (Sanoff, 2000). Some scholars have argued that participation is contextual, meaning it varies in type, level of intensity, extent, and frequency (Sanoff, 2000).

3. Public Involvement Inclusivity, Locations & Time

Public involvement should be done with inclusivity in mind allowing accurate representation of the community to be reflected (Lenskyj, 2017). This encompasses considering demographic factors like gender, ethnicity, age, ability, socioeconomic status, religion, occupation, and place of residence. In the initial stages, it is important to identify who is, or must be, involved within the public involvement process. Understanding this information can allow engagement to be shaped around the characteristics, behaviors and needs of those involved. When considering how and when to engage with stakeholders, it is important to consider their occupations, times they
are free, where they regularly meet, accessibility needs, language barriers, and cultural connotations. For example, if a project is known for its emphasis on senior citizen groups, then public involvement opportunities should be based on their needs, i.e., accessible meeting locations, adequate information material for elderly, appropriate availability times, known senior community spaces etc. It is important to determine how and when intended audiences are to be engaged and how to maximize opportunities for input (Cummings, 2014). Some recent involvement strategies involve “bringing consultation to the people” and engaging to their needs for enhanced opportunities of involvement (Galloway, et al. 2014). To effectively engage with the public, engagement must occur on their own terms, their schedule and in places and spaces that they congregate (Galloway, et al. 2014). This can be done by setting up information kiosks or scheduling meetings at senior centers, community centers, schools, malls, neighbourhood events, sports games etc.

4. Two-Way Communication

Communication between organizing coalitions and civil society, stakeholder groups, media etc. should involve a two-way form of communication (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). This involves the transmission of information and knowledge between different individuals and groups. Failing to allow this transaction of knowledge and ideas can create tokenistic participatory approaches discussed by scholars like Arnstein (1969). Two-way communication enables engagement to become a collaborative effort rather than a manipulative process. It is vital for engagement teams to listen to the concerns, ideas, and knowledge of the public, and allow citizens to have the opportunity to be involved (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003).
5. Transparency and Accountability

For public involvement to be successful it is important for consulting parties to be transparent and accountable throughout engagement processes. Providing adequate information, being truthful, and engaging in a respectful manner can allow the development of trust with the public (Cummings, 2014). For public involvement to be accountable, communities must be involved through various stages of the process. It is also important for consulters to acknowledge the beliefs of participants and address any concerns of participants in a timely manner (Cummings, 2014). Public participation should not be understood as a mandatory task that can be checked off, it is necessary to establish frequent interactions at various stages of an urban process to create trust building with communities (Lenskyj, 2008; 2017). It is important to maintain an ongoing dialogue with participants and inform citizens of their impacts on proposed decisions. This ensures that those involved see their input was received, understood and valued (City of Waterloo, 2017; Lenskyj, 2017).

6. Use a Variety of Techniques

The public meeting as a public engagement mechanism has been over used and poorly employed throughout planning involvement processes (Connor, 1990; Dorcey et al., 1994; Jackson, 2001). Giving a deputation in a typical meeting can be a “very tedious project” for citizens, which may create barriers for the engagement of various individuals (Lenskyj, 2017). Overly lengthy presentations, limited speaking times, lack of collaborative communication, sense of us vs. them divisions, are some critiques of the typical public meeting format (Connor, 1990; Dorcey et al., 1994; Jackson, 2001). Due to the diversity of views in communities, it is essential that consultation processes provide different ways for perspectives to be shared (Cummings, 2014).
Attending public meetings may not be as accessible or desirable for some citizens, therefore public involvement options should provide alternative techniques to allow the sharing and gathering of information (Cummings, 2014). These techniques can involve surveys, design charrettes, workshops, roundtables, focus group meetings, community advisory groups, field trips/tours, mapping exercises, community art projects, photography, online forums, e-participation, and drop-in offices.

7. Reinforce Community Values & Community Building

When engaging with communities, it is argued that public involvement should be done in a way that reinforces community values and builds on existing community assets (Kretzman & Mcknight, 1993; Sanoff, 2000). Community involvement should be positive and constructive to avoid top-down totalitarian planning connotations. Community initiatives under a perspective of “solving problems” can cast a negative tone over what should be a positive “capacity-building process” (Kretzman & Mcknight, 1993; Sanoff, 2000). Aside from the techniques listed in point 6., one method that can help determine community values involves the use of storytelling, which allows citizens to share their local knowledge and wisdom about their community through stories (Sandercock, 2003). Sharing one’s knowledge through personal stories can be less intimidating for some citizens within engagement processes. After listening and gathering stories community leaders or engagement facilitators can follow up by finding common threads that help draw up community priorities and values (Sandercock, 2003).
8. **Adequate Time and Information**

Sufficient information and adequate timeframes are important for any public participation process. Giving participants adequate resources, time to analyze issues, and review information, can enhance the success of any participation process (Sanoff, 2000). It is crucial for the public to be given sufficient information to allow them to make an informed decision (Sanoff, 2000). Adequate notification for such engagement must also be provided through various forms of communication. Public involvement advertisements should be noticeable, clear, multilingual, readable and free from autocratic jargon, to generate interest (Jackson, 2001). It is also important to consider various forms of techniques that can be used to distribute information to the public. This can involve newsletters/brochures mailings, internet postings, exhibits and displays, social media, webinars, presentations to organizations, news features through radio and print (Cummings, 2014).

9. **Creating Safe Space/Equal Opportunity**

It is vital for public participation to be implemented in a “safe space” where individuals can be free to express their concerns and share their knowledge. Creating safe spaces allows individuals to feel comfortable to share their beliefs without being judged or criticized. Engagement teams must do their best to create an atmosphere for the public to feel comfortable within involvement spaces and to enforce respectful, safe, and tolerant discussions. It is also important for everyone to have an equal opportunity to be a part of the conversation. At times “community consultation in a big city, [can allow] people who are best educated, most secure, most articulate, financially well off” to dominate ongoing conversations (personal interview Lenskyj, 2017). Although
everyone is encouraged to be involved, it is important to allow people who lack a voice to be heard and not be overshadowed by dominant personalities (Lenskyj, 2017).

10. Need for Adequate Facilitators

Personnel with adequate facilitating experience and knowledge is also needed when engaging with communities. Facilitating public involvement requires great skill to drive conversations forward in an ethical and productive manner (Galloway, et al. 2014). Facilitators must consider the qualities and needs of publics to be engaged. Identifying language barriers, accessibility needs, cultural connotations, religious beliefs, gender views, economic statuses, political views must all be considered for engagement processes (Lenskyj, 2017). Considering these characteristics can help facilitate meetings and provide greater understandings of the people involved and how to successfully engage communities.

11. Evaluate Public involvement

It is important to evaluate the effectiveness of a public involvement process after its completion (City of Waterloo, 2017). Key questions one can ask involve, did the process reach the right people and ask the right questions? Did the people who were involved feel they were heard? Did the process achieve expected outcomes/involvement? (City of Waterloo, 2017). This can identify future needs and identify valuable information for the ongoing development process or future projects that are similar (City of Waterloo, 2017).
5. Conclusion

Within the last three decades, the city of Toronto has engaged in various mega-event processes and discussions across its urban regions. The 1996 Olympic Bid, the 2008 Olympic bid, and the 2025 World Expo pre-bid are interesting case studies that shed light on Toronto’s relation to mega-event processes. Although Toronto has yet to host a hallmark, this essay has explored how mega-event bidding processes in the city have typically taken on an anti-democratic approach within its planning processes. This can be seen through the omission of public involvement opportunities, tokenistic participation tactics, or the complete omission of community involvement. I believe that this represents a fundamental flaw in the way Toronto has approached these events.

Furthermore, these case studies also reveal other factors that challenge democratic planning within urban processes. Through the essay, we can observe how neoliberal urban entrepreneurial forms of urban governance that emphasize market-oriented growth as a main strategic driver for urban development and growth, can challenge forms of democratic planning. These hegemonic ideals for growth and economic competitiveness can cast a shadow over other quality-of-life needs (Kipfer & Keil, 2002; Lenskyj, 2017).

Through this essay, I have argued over the importance of democratic public involvement within any mega-event planning processes. Public involvement is an essential component for ensuring a successful and ethical hallmark event. Mega-event processes should enforce current planning legislation and values that advocate for the inclusion of public involvement within decision-making processes, and be used for the development of “hosting visions” which are representative of existing city goals and the public interest. Public involvement allows citizens to
become actively involved in defining issues that concern them and in formulating and implementing strategies to achieve change.

Public involvement is a vital component for mega-event processes as it allows citizens to have a role in determining the public interest and urban development priorities. As the planning practice must continue to advocate for the public interest, public engagement and collaboration must play a vital role within urban mega-event processes that tend to operate in a democratic deficit. Given Toronto’s continued desire to host a hallmark event, understanding the importance of democratic planning processes and the dangers of anti-democratic “post-political” approaches is greatly needed for the future success and equity of Toronto’s urban processes.
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